Resolution 2334 and a Two-State Solution: Part A

Resolution 2334 and a Two-State Solution: Part A

by

Howard Adelman

Thus far, I have published two blogs in this series, one on the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Wall and a second on Demography, Settlements and Jerusalem. The point was to document both the legal issues and the facts on the ground. This blog, in its several parts, has more to do with policy and addresses the question of the two-State solution; namely, to what degree and why does Resolution 2334 depict the settlements as a threat to that solution. Usually, I indicate future installments of a series at the end of a blog. But this time I will do it up-front to assure readers that I intend to go into some matters more thoroughly in subsequent blogs. They will be, in order:
The American Approach to the Resolution;
The Israeli Approach to the Resolution;
The Consequences of the Resolution.

In defence of America’s abstention on UNSC Resolution 2334, John Kerry said that the Resolution reiterated the “vision of a region where two democratic States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side in peace within secure and recognized borders.” He argued that the Resolution was a last ditch effort to “stabilize the situation and to reverse negative trends on the ground, which are steadily eroding the two-State solution and entrenching a one-State reality.” Further, he insisted that the resolution would help “create the conditions for successful final status negotiations and for advancing the two-State solution through those negotiations and on the ground.” All of this was said against a background in which John Kerry has clearly stated that, although he supports Israel and although the U.S. remains totally committed to Israeli security and legitimacy, the building of settlements was identified by Kerry as the main threat to the two-State solution. Further, and perhaps more importantly, he had concluded that Netanyahu was only paying lip service to the two-State solution, and was supporting settlement policies that threatened that solution.

Key elements in the current right-wing Israeli cabinet, the most right-wing in Israeli history, are absolutely opposed to the creation of a Palestinian state living side-by-side in peace with Israel. Naftali Bennett, one of Netanyahu’s coalition partners, recently announced that, “the era of the two-state solution is over.” On the other side of the barrier, increasing numbers of Palestinians have come to the same conclusion, and did so when Bennett was merely promoting the idea and not yet declaring it a fait accompli.

Many past UN resolutions targeted settlements as a threat to a peace agreement and a two-State solution. If the United States belatedly came to this recognition, why did the Obama administration not support UNSC Resolution 2334? Why did the U.S. abstain? United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 adopted unanimously on 22 November 1967 established the principles for framing an Arab-Israeli peace agreement. It affirmed the “inadmissibility of the acquisition of territories by force” that I discussed in an earlier blog. Israeli interpreters argued the inadmissibility clause was irrelevant to Israel because the territory was acquired in a defensive war and, in any case, was not taken from a sovereign power. Most international legal experts dispute this interpretation.

According to the drafters of Resolution 242, however, the Resolution not only required direct negotiations between the disputing parties, but also required withdrawal from captured territories. But not ALL the territories. The term “all” was deliberately excluded from the draft against the opposition of the Arab states. The drafters, and those who supported Resolution 242 at the time expected that, in the negotiations, there would be some exchange of territory in a peace agreement. This may be one case in which diplomatic equivocation and the use of ambiguity – central to the art of diplomacy – may have caused more trouble in the long run compared to the short term benefit of gaining a consensus in support of Resolution 242.

Meanwhile, Israel began its program of settlements, initially for military defensive purposes, allowed under international humanitarian law, but also to make claims for territory, initially in some of the areas captured near Jerusalem. In great prescience, Jacob Talmon, the late great Israeli historian, in 1967 raged and warned about the threat expanding settlements would pose for a peace agreement, then with Jordan. Ten years after the end of the Six Day War and four years after the disastrous Yom Kippur War, Menachem Begin became Prime Minister on 21 June 1977. During his period as head of government, he made a peace agreement with Egypt and gave the Sinai in its entirety back. For that, he and Egyptian President Anwar el-Sādāt won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1978.

In the shadow and the glory of that agreement, Begin’s government passed the Jerusalem Law on 30 July 1980 which declared Jerusalem to be the united capital of Israel, but without specifying its boundaries and without formal annexation. Nevertheless, that was sufficient to stimulate an enormous international backlash. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 478 declaring Israel’s 1980 Jerusalem Law, which de facto but not de jure annexed East Jerusalem, as illegal. The vote was 14-0 with the U.S. abstaining. Further, UN legal experts contended that, even though the Resolution was passed under Chapter VI, it was still binding on all states based on a 1971 ruling of the International Court of Justice. Consequently, there are no longer any foreign embassies whatsoever in Jerusalem.

The period from 1980 to the Oslo Accords marked a new phase of settlement activity under the leadership of a party that claimed all of the West Bank as rightfully belonging to Israel. Begin’s government began an aggressive program of expansion of settlements that clearly lacked even the pretence of any defensive military function. But the greatest fiery storm was set off, not by the settlements, but by what happened on the Temple Mount or what the Arabs call al-Ḥaram al-Šarīf, or the “Noble Sanctuary.” On 8 October 1990, when Bibi Netanyahu was Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Israeli Border Police killed 17 Palestinians and wounded many more in a so-called riot on that site. They were killed because, according to Netanyahu who treated truth with as much reverence as Donald Trump, the Palestinians were throwing stones down on worshipers at the Wall in a deliberate attempt to deflect attention away from Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait two months earlier on 2 August 1990.

It so happened that there were no worshipers at the Wall that day. They had been removed for their own safety. Instead, the Temple Mount Faithful, a group of Jewish Zealots promoting the reconstruction of the Temple on its original site, announced a plan to march on the Temple Mount in contravention of an explicit Israeli court order not to do so. To confront the Zealots, an extreme group of Palestinians gathered on the Temple Mount with rocks to confront the Jewish Zealots. In confusion, set off by an explosion of unknown origin among the gathered Palestinians, the Palestinians began throwing the rocks at the Border Police. The Border Police retaliated with live ammunition, initially killing one Palestinian.

That instigated a full-scale riot. With reinforcements, the Israeli Border Police launched an assault on the Temple Mount killing 17 and wounding many more. The uproar was not caused by the Temple Mount Faithful, even though their initial announcement had been an instigating factor. Nor had it been caused by Palestinian Zealots resisting them or raining rocks down on innocent worshipers at the Western Wall as Bibi then contended, though the Palestinians had indeed prepared themselves with rocks to protect the grounds of the Noble Sanctuary. The prime cause was the use of excessive military force in a volatile situation. (For a very recent recounting of the incident, read Barry Lantos’ blog published on 3 November 2016. He was one of the investigative reporters who had covered the story.)

James Baker, head of the State Department in the President George H.W. Bush administration, in 1990 banned Netanyahu from the State Department, not as rumoured because of disputes with American officials over policy or over the West Bank or the Temple Mount, but because of the same type of lies and distortions Netanyahu repeatedly made, especially in reference to American diplomatic efforts.

The situation changed with the election of Rabin and the conclusion of the Oslo Accord in 1993 and the 1995 extensions. In Oslo, settlements were recognized as matters for negotiation. Further, the territory of the West Bank was divided into three different areas, Area A under the administrative and security authority of the Palestinian Authority, Area B under the administrative authority of the Palestinian Authority and Area C under both the administrative and security authority of Israel. The situations of Gaza and East Jerusalem were left unchanged. The establishment and growth of settlements, as recognized in the Oslo Accords, did not indicate where the lines would be drawn between the Israeli and Palestinian states.

After a burst of expansion of settlements before Oslo and under the initial Netanyahu administration, by far the greatest expansion of settlements in the West Bank took place under the early years of Arik Sharon, who was Prime Minister from February 2001 to 2006 until he suffered a stroke. Resolution 2334 repeats resolution 1515 endorsing the 2003 Quartet Roadmap that required a freeze on settlement growth, including so-called “natural” growth, and dismemberment of all settlements constructed since 2001.

Why 2001? 22 settlements were established in 2001 and 19 in 2002 – Alt 468, Ancient Susiya Synagogue, Asa’el, Bat Ayin West, Elmatan, Gal Outpost, Gilad Farm, Gival Assaf, Givat Sal’it, Hakaron, Harro’eh, Kochav Ya’akov West, Migron, Mitzpe Lach, Mitzpe Yitzhar, Neve Danile North, Nofei Nehemia, Ramat Gilad, and T’koa D. In contrast, there were only two in 2003 (Kochav Ya’akov East and Mitzpe Eshtamoa), three in 2004 (Bnei Adam, Mishpatei Eretz and Ofra Zion Mizrah, and only one in 2005 – Omer Farm. The period of enormous expansion of numbers of settlements was over, but not the expansion of the size of Israeli settlements recognized as legal by Israel.

That period afterwards and before made the Oslo years seem an exception to the expansionist phases of settlements from 1980 to 1992 and then again after Rabin was assassinated. What changed from 12 or 13 years ago to suddenly make settlements the threat to a two-State solution for the United States at this time, but did not back then? Why not 2007 when Obama first came to power? Why not in 2014 following Bibi Netanyahu’s announcement that 1,260 new housing units would be built in East Jerusalem, 600 units to be constructed in Ramat Shlomo in north-eastern Jerusalem, a settlement founded in 1995 adjacent to Shuafat and Beit Hanina in the same year when the extensions to the Oslo Accords were agreed upon. Another 660 units were to be built in Har Homa established in 1997 in south-eastern Jerusalem near Beit Sahour with a view of nearby Bethlehem.

In 2015, Netanyahu responded angrily when the Jerusalem municipality froze the planned expansion of Har Homa by 1,500 homes. There was certainly a fight in 2014 over settlements. One Obama administration official called Netanyahu a “chickenshit,” echoing an insult directed at Netanyahu by an official in the Clinton administration. Why did the U.S. not officially declare settlements illegal then? Why did the U.S. at that time not depict settlements as an imminent and existential explicit threat to a two-State solution? Instead settlements were then called obstacles to peace and were sometimes dubbed illegitimate. But they had not been labeled illegal by the U.S.

Part of the difficulty in understanding the problem is that there are at least four two-State solutions. Settlements impact on each differently. But let me mention the various one-State solutions first. There is the vision held by a few right-wing Israeli extremists in Netanyahu’s cabinet who believe in incorporating all of the West Bank as Israeli sovereign territory. In one variation, many Palestinians who refused to pledge loyalty to Israel would be expelled. In another variation, Palestinians would be given permanent residency status, but not citizenship, but would be expelled if they proved to threaten Israeli security.

In a second version, there would be one sovereign state encompassing Israel, Area C and East Jerusalem. Areas A and B would have an independent internal self-governing authority as a satrap of Israel. In a third version, there would be a single state in all of the old mandate territory, including the Gaza Strip. Jews and Palestinians would have equal citizenship and equal rights in a single state. This is a vision that went back to idealists like Martin Buber and is still upheld today by current idealists. In a fourth version, Israel-Palestine would be a federated state with two provinces – Palestine and Israel with Jerusalem operated as a federal district. The federal authority would have responsibility for security, foreign relations, trade and monetary policy. Clearly, there could be many variations of all of these versions. Perhaps there are even one or two more versions, but the likelihood of anyone of them coming about is slim to none.

I could, of course, be wrong. After all, I was wrong about the extent that settlements would develop. I never believed that the settlement activities would take place to the extent that they did. But, in spite of the extent of the settlements, I still believe that a two-State solution is the only realistic option, though some of the versions of this option are as unrealistic as any of the one-State solutions. There is the vision of two states based on the 1967 cease- fire lines. Secondly, there is the vision of two states in which the settlements around Jerusalem are incorporated into West Jerusalem as the capital of an Israeli state but East Jerusalem, including the Old City, would become part of a Palestinian state. There is a version in which Israel assumes control of the Old City with religious rights guaranteed to Palestinians and, indeed, all Muslims. In a version John Kerry seems to favour, Jerusalem would remain united, but as a capital of both states. All of these versions, I believe, are unrealistic, but John Kerry’s is, I believe, the most unrealistic.

A more likely version would be that Area C would be transferred to Israeli jurisdiction with some deletions while an equivalent amount of Israeli territory would be transferred to the Palestinian state so that state would have approximately 22% of the Mandate territory, the amount under Arab control before the Six Day War. Though this option, given Oslo, is the one most likely, that likelihood is undercut by the argument over Jerusalem. In one variation, the Israelis in the settlements being transferred to the Palestinians would become dual citizens of both Palestine and Israel. In another scenario, the settlers would be offered an economic benefit in exchange for returning to Israel. In a quite different variation, everything would be settled except for the Old City; it would remain under Israeli jurisdiction until an agreement could be made about it. This seems the most likely outcome. The thickening of the existing settlements in the suburbs of Jerusalem and in Area C does nothing to threaten this version of the two-State solution.

The threat to the two-State solution now comes primarily from the issue of Jerusalem, not the settlements. The Palestinians see East Jerusalem, including the Old City, as the capital of their future state. Most Israelis support an undivided Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, though some of them would exclude East Jerusalem but not the Old City. The reality is that settlements have always threatened a two-State solution. They did in 1967 when they were created to assert claims on Jerusalem and to establish military defense positions in the West Bank – and then under a Labour government. Establishing new settlements reached a peak threat in the first years of this century. There is little reason to declare that the last few years, with the main focus on “thickening” the existing settlements, poses any greater threat than ever before. In fact, the pattern of settlements suggests that de facto borders are being made on the ground between an Israeli and a Palestinian state. That may not have been the scenario I defended for years, but it does take the reality into account that Israel will not be willing or able to resettle 400,000 of its citizens. It barely managed to resettle 9,000 from Gaza.

With the help of Alex Zisman

To be continued.

The Canadian Zionist Counter-Attack – BDS Redux II

BDS II: The Zionist Counter-Attack

by

Howard Adelman

In yesterday’s blog, I referred to the disproportionately large numbers of emails that I received in the last week concerning the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement (BDS), my own past writing on BDS, the call by the Kadima MK, Dr. Nachman Shai, to fight BDS with an idea, and the usual defensive stance one usually reads in Jewish and public media sources. I could also have described many of the counter-positions taken against BDS as offensive in both senses of that word. For an offensive action or verbal response is one that is aggressive and combative, but may also be one that is repugnant, more upsetting than informative, insulting and derogatory more than enlightening, abusive rather than respectful of the truth.
One of my readers responded to yesterday’s blog as follows:

I read with interest your communications on BDS and IJV. It is refreshing to see someone write about this without spewing vitriol against those of us who are critical of Israel, but are anything but antisemitic.
There is one point that I think merits more discussion, and that is the contention that BDS (and IJVers) are out to destroy Israel as the home of the Jews, among other things, because when we denounce Israeli discrimination against Palestinians as being as bad as apartheid (I believe this is so in the Occupied territories), we are delegitimizing the state of Israel and thus paving the way for its end, and thus the end of a safe Jewish homeland.

This assumes that a democratic state, where Jews and Palestinians are equal, ergo not a Jewish state, cannot be a safe home for Jews. I don’t think that follows. I think that even if there were a Palestinian majority, Israel/Palestine could be (my italics) a safe home for both ethnicities; in fact, I think that is the only safe outcome for both Jews and Palestinians. I think that in order to arrive at this, Israel and the Occupied territories would probably go through a confederation before becoming a plurinational state. South Africa got rid of Apartheid and did not descend into chaos and the whites have not been kicked into the sea, despite the big problems of that nation.

The policies of the present Jabotinski Zionist government of Israel are in, my opinion, suicidal, because the Arab states that are inimical to Israel will eventually acquire the means to destroy Israel and be able to insist on an outcome that is not safe for Jews and this will be unsafe for Palestinians as well.

With best regards.

I think that the idea that, given the current Middle East, where Christian religious cleansing has been at full tilt for at least the last three decades, should be trusted to tolerate a Jewish minority, where Arab pogroms against Jews were not uncommon prior to the creation of Israel, where Arab countries aggressively attacked the nascent Jewish state when the United Nations endorsed the creation of three states in Mandatory Palestine – a Jewish state that became Israel, a Palestinian Arab state that was mostly annexed by Jordan, and Jerusalem as a city state under international auspices – is naïve in the extreme. But asking Jews to take that risk given that environment of extreme hostility is more than naïve. It is suicidal. Or, at the very least, there is a significant risk of suicide. And Jewish Israelis are neither suicidal nor willing to take that risk.

Further, since the United Nations in 1947 and 1948 decided that combining the two groups in one state was unworkable – and, as I documented, this included supporters of the Arabs in Palestine – why do not supporters of a one-state solution with a majority of Arabs accept that international determination? Why do they not embrace the two-state solution? Further, in advocating a majoritarian Palestinian solution, why do they not try to engage is a civil dialogue and instead expend much effort in branding Israel as an apartheid and racist state? Whatever its faults and whatever the criticisms of the right in Israel, Israel is not by any reasonable measure an apartheid or racist state as much as I personally am repelled by some policies. Further, my reader who sent this response I know is not anti-Semitic. But he is clearly an anti-Zionist. He clearly supports BDS, IJV and the dismantling of the Israeli state. He is at least honest about that.

Why can Norwegians, Scots and Quebeckers vote to have their own state but Jews cannot? Why can other Jews, who have now shrunken to a very small minority, accept the fact that the overwhelming proportion of Jews have become supporters of Jews having their own state, even if they themselves have not become Zionists? Why cannot Jews have a state that can defend itself, especially given past behaviour of their neighbours? It is not totally unsurprising and even understandable that in such a context such advocates are branded – quite aside from what they actually are – as not only anti-Zionists, but advocates who often try to disguise that anti-Zionism.

Further, the almost obsessive focus on Israel and almost total disregard of the much grosser abuse of rights by states that surround Israel, more specifically the abuse of rights by the Khomeini regime (how many Baha’is have been murdered by that regime?) can, again, understandably lead those who support Israel to regard the position of BDSers and IJVers as at least bordering on anti-Semitism, even if those advocates may not actually be guilty of such beliefs? If they deny Jews, and usually only Jews, the right to self-determination, is it not at least a possibility that this constitutes anti-Semitism even if they contend they are not motivated in the least by anti-Semitism?

History has spoken. Why do they not listen?

Except as revealed in the last sentence – the supporters of BDS and IJV want to reverse history, view that history as reversible and expect as well as support the destruction of Israel as a state for the Jewish people, a state in which non-Jews can live as citizens with equal rights.

But that criticism is not the object of this blog. Rather, I want to examine the attacks against BDS and the small segment of Jews represented by IJV that supports such policies.

Tyler Levitan, a vociferous supporter of both BDS and IJV, penned a piece called, “Israel Lobby’s War On Boycott Movement Distracts From Reality.” Setting aside for the moment whether this description is more applicable to the position of IJV, what is the contention? After all, the charge is made not only against Zionists and the Jewish establishment, but against Canada’s political establishment, including both Liberals and Conservatives and even New Democrats. It is why the BDS movement and its IJV supporters have targeted The Green Party given its weak defenses against such assaults from a determined minority and why they have linked their attack to environmentalism in trying to delegitimize the Jewish National Fund (JNF).

Levitan is correct in countering the charge that BDS is an “absolute” failure, if only because it has attracted great attention and the deployment of significant resources by the Jewish community. Further, BDS claims some concrete successes. After all, was not BDS cited (my italics) as a prime cause in a 50% drop in foreign direct investments in Israel in 2015? But citation is not proof either that BDS was a prime cause of this claimed drop or, more significantly, that, Israel suffered a decline in foreign investment at all. A simple survey of economic assessments in this respect, either by the IMF or internal Israeli bank information, suggests that Israel did not suffer a 50% drop but managed a significant gain (19%) over 2014, and only a modest 3% drop relative to the record gain in 2013. No self-respecting economist would suggest that these fluctuations had anything to do with BDS. BDSers are reliable at blowing their own horn, but not on the justifications for doing so. There were a record 90 private investment deals in Israel in 2015 totaling in value $3.4 billion. All this merely suggests that BDS is better at propaganda than at truth.

That, however, is an aside. For the main battleground, as both BDSers and IJVers acknowledge, is over control of the dominant narrative. And, whatever the serious weaknesses of this anti-Zionist lobby and their efforts to portray themselves as representatives of Canadian public opinion, they repeatedly try to characterize the issue of return of Palestinian refugees as a universal rights issue, but do not insist on such so-called “universal rights” for the myriad of other refugee groups, including the Jewish refugees forcefully displaced from the West Bank. Further, refugee return has not become a universal right, as much as many of us would choose to make it one. It unequivocally was not a universal right when the Palestinians fled and were forcefully displaced in 1948. Nor is UN Resolution 194 calling for a return or compensation based on such a presumption. (Again, I refer readers to Howard Adelman and Elazar Barkan (2011) No Return, No Refuge. New York: Columbia University Press.)

BDS claims that Israel was founded on racial ethnic cleansing, ignoring who attacked whom, other neighbours who have engaged in ethnic and religious cleansing and the fact that although the number of those forced out of their homes and villages was indeed large, a majority of those refugees simply fled war. More credibility might be given to the BDSers and IJVers if their approach was the least bit balanced and they were not driven by the goal of delegitimizing Israel and Zionism that led to Israel’s creation, if they advocated that all Jews who were or whose ancestors were driven out of Europe should retroactively be given European citizenship, if they insisted with equal strength that Bosniacs who fled predominantly Serbian areas in former Yugoslavia and Serbs forced to flee from Croatia should be given the right to return in security, then their position might be respected for its dispassion and impartiality rather than simply as a front for an anti-Zionist stance.

To say that, “Israel is already an Arab-majority state; 52% of Israelis are Sephardic and Mizrachi Jews, most coming from Arab states,” is disingenuous at the very least since those Israelis identify themselves as Jews from Arab lands not as Arabs. Further, I have also not read anywhere BDSers and IJVers taking up the issue of compensation for Jews from Arab lands. The majority of Jews in Israel are now sabras (72%) even if a majority of their ancestors are Mizrahi. As a population, they are the group most opposed to the possibility of living in a state where the Jews will not be a majority. Citing racist epithets of some Israelis – and there are too many of them – is not a reason to reject Zionism or the legitimacy of the Israeli state.

It is in that context that the attacks on BDS and on IJV must be understood, even if the efforts to blacken BDS and IJV by suggesting they are anti-Semitic and Holocaust deniers, may be counter-productive in the long run even if possibly yielding short term success. For then groups like B’nai Brith join BDS and IJV in a pattern of distortion and mudslinging. “Zionists are racists.” “BDS is an anti-Semitic movement.” “Zionists practice apartheid.” “BDS associates with Holocaust deniers.” Though there is a grain of truth in the epithets aimed at the “enemy,” the overall portrayal disfigures much more than it configures. In ignoring that it was the UN that recommended that a Jewish state be recognized in Palestine, BDS perpetuate a calumny against the state that does border on anti-Semitism, even if that is not the motive of those anti-Zionist advocates. If B’nai Brith accuses all supporters of the BDS position as supporting anti-Semitism and even Holocaust denial, one calumny may balance another, but at the expense of balance and truth.

Not all supporters of BDS or of IJV are anti-Zionists. They may only be critical of Israeli government policies in the West Bank. But the main thrust of BDS and IJV is anti-Zionist. Becoming a fellow traveler risks being drawn into the same maelstrom.

The focus of one of the recent stories I read was on the last of a three-part series by B’nai Brith (BB), which advertises itself as Canada’s League for Human Rights. The series set out to expose IJV as, at core, anti-Jewish, even though it is made up of so-called Jews. After all, if IJV aligns itself with the Khomeini regime of Iran, as Ken Stone, the founder of IJV did in expressing his appreciation of the legacy of Ayatollah Khomeini in 2016 at a celebration of the his 27th anniversary in Toronto. Even if many of Ken Stone’s relatives may have died in the Holocaust, a fact cited to prove that Stone is free of any association with Holocaust denial, and as much as he might insist that Khomeini wass not a Holocaust denier, the overwhelming evidence is that both he and many of his religious and political heirs were and are.

Though it is totally understandable why B’nai Brith might ask how any self-respecting Jew could support Khomeini, since Stone has explicitly praised him. Further, IJV had posted on its website (subsequently taken down) praise of Alan Hart, an author associated with Veterans Today, who was called by IJV a “widely-respected journalist and mid-East expert” when he was an explicit Holocaust denier. IJV subsequently disassociated itself from Veterans Day and dubbed its site as “extremely disreputable” engaging in “wild conspiracy theory.”

It is one thing for Iran to adopt such a horrific stance as Holocaust denial and adopt as a military objective eliminating the State of Israel. But for an ostensibly Jewish group to do so was particularly appalling. How could IJV identify with Khomeini, an explicit Holocaust denier, and then condemn another group for its Holocaust denial? Another IJV spokesman, Tyler Levitan, played a leading role in opposing the effort to make BDF illegal in Ontario in concert with successful attempts to do so in 21 of the states in the U.S. (California may be next.)

The campaign in Ontario, unlike many in the U.S., was a failure. One has a sense that Jewish organizations try to offset part of the failure by attacking the press for offering an inordinate proportion of space to an organization that represents very few Jews, that the Jews it represents are associated with nutty causes and associate with radical anti-Zionism and support for the elimination of Israel, and have even been linked to Holocaust denial defined by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) formed by 31 democracies, including Canada, as the negation of historical reality, denying its extent and relieving the Nazi responsibility by suggesting that Jews and/or Jewish organizations shared responsibility.

B’nai Brith did all of this and then went into overdrive, “calling upon Elizabeth May to once and for all, clarify if she is one of those members who wish to change the anti-BDS policy of the Green Party. If she does not support what BB labels as the anti-Semitic motions up for debate in its annual convention in August, she must immediately withdraw herself as co-sponsor and join her parliamentary colleagues in vociferously opposing BDF. In the BB statement, she must:
a) Immediately withdraw the antisemitic anti-Israel motions scheduled for discussion at the Green Party convention in August;
b) Issue a formal apology to all Canadians for her disingenuous email reply;
c) State, once and for all, her position on the antisemitic Boycott & Sanctions movement;
d) Disavow all Green Party affiliations to Independent Jewish Voices.

Elizabeth May lacks the power to do a) above. B’nai Brith is the party that is disingenuous in asking for a formal apology, for May’s letter, as weak and full of questions as it was, needs no apology from her. It may be unsound. It may be inadequately stated. It may be confused and run contrary to the usual clarity of her positions. But it is not something requiring an apology. Elizabeth May could state her personal policy on BDS and disavow IJV. I would not hold my breath.
So efforts are made to attack organizations that support BDS by linking them with Holocaust denial and with the goal of eliminating Israel. Efforts are made to bring a full body press against political parties that flirt with endorsing BDS. But positive efforts are also made. In celebrity politics, Helen Mirren, the Oscar Award-winning British actress, was the latest (others include Dionne Warwick, Alan Parsons and Kevin Costner) to be used to blast BDS. Further, Mirren went on to praise Israeli artists and even denounced artists (Roger Waters, Elvis Costello, Lauren Hill) that shunned Israel.

One must distinguish between those who believe boycotts, divestment and sanctions to be legally and morally justified from those who oppose the BDS movement itself as an illegitimate and/or erroneously aimed use of this protest technique. Thus, in the U.S., 62% find boycotts, divestment and sanctions to be legitimate, but only half of those support BDS. In Britain, the support for BDS increases from one-third to 40%. Whether support is 33% or 40%, it is clear why this is a major policy concern for Israel and why the red flag is being raised. It is also why Israel uses not only celebrities to take opposite stands, but has enlisted a number of allies in the diaspora as research and attack dogs.

Dr. Nachman Shai argued that we need an idea to go against BDS, not throwing mud at everyone who stands near a supporter of BDS or of IJV. I, however, may be wrong. It is I who may be naïve. Perhaps the only approach to BDS and IJV is to use a sledgehammer rather than a sharp pen.

With the help of Alex Zisman

Palestine

Palestine
by
Howard Adelman

This morning, I was going to continue my survey of Middle East countries, primarily in relationship to Israel, and in continuation of my blogs on Iran, Egypt and Turkey, by writing on Jordan. However, yesterday I received a copy of a resolution that Jordan, as a newly-elected rotating members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), was circulating to existing and newly-elected members of that Council that the Palestinian Authority (PA) had approved on Wednesday. The proposed resolution has been published in this morning’s Haaretz and is appended hereto.

Since October, the PA had been promising to ask the United Nations Security Council to pass a resolution requiring Israel’s retreat to the pre-1967 line, but evidently thought there was a better chance of obtaining the required 9 of 15 votes of Council members needed to pass if the resolution was brought to a vote after the new Security Council takes office on 1 January 2015 and when five of the existing members are replaced by five new members. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan had been circulating drafts since November. On 29 November 2014, a pan-Arab draft on a Palestinian state had been sent to the Security Council as the United Kingdom, France and, a non-member, Germany, were evidently preparing their own versions. All this was taking place against the background of a number of European states, beginning with Sweden, recognizing Palestine. In October, the British parliament, with an overwhelming majority, passed a non-binding motion recognizing Palestine as a state.

On the 17th of December, almost as soon as the blue-lined (final version) draft resolution had been made available to the Security Council, US Secretary of State, John Kerry, announced that the US would veto the resolution. The quick promise of a veto was not expected. In fact, it had been uncertain whether the administration would even veto at all. The swift announcement is an indicator that the Obama administration regards the current resolution as an outlier. The USA, especially the Obama administration with its multilateralist approach to international issues, has been wary of using its veto power in the UNSC. On 1 February 2011, the US cast its first veto in the UNSC to block a draft Palestinian resolution declaring Israel’s settlements in the West Bank as both illegal and an obstacle to peace. This was followed by the year-long Kerry initiative that finally collapsed this past spring.

The government of Israel had unequivocally expressed its opposition to the resolution. But so did key leaders of the opposition. On Wednesday, Tzipi Livni urged John Kerry to announce the US intention to veto the resolution. Israel’s announcement of its opposition to the resolution and its intention to try to prevent it from passing may seem redundant given the threat of a US veto, but a vetoed resolution has moral force that a defeated resolution lacks. It is this difference between passing the resolution that is vetoed and failing to even pass the resolution that explains why the resolution is being submitted at this time. The Palestinians think they have the votes in the new year to pass the resolution.

However, Palestinian UN representative Riyad Mansour, on behalf of the PA, announced that it is not seeking a speedy vote, and, further, that it is willing to negotiate the terms of the resolution. In other words, this is an effort to restart peace negotiations under other auspices even if the veto hangs over the whole process. The veteran Palestinian negotiator, Saeb Erakat, said that the PA wanted a statement of clear principles of peace.

What did he say they were?
1. A Palestinian state within the 1967 borders;
2. Jerusalem as its capital;
3. The release of all prisoners;
4. A declaration that all settlements are illegal.

As we shall see, they are not quite congruent with the published resolution, especially the third principle above. Nevertheless, given this statement of principles, and given that it took the USA less than 24 hours to promise a veto, why did Jordan’s Foreign Minister, Nasser Joudah, accompany the release of the resolution to other member of the UN Security Council with the boast that the Hashemite Kingdom, because of the prestige of the King, was more influential than the State of Israel, not only with the US administration and the State Department, but the US Congress as well?

Before answering the latter question, let’s turn to the version of the resolution that has been published. (See the addendum to this blog.) After the fourteen clauses in the preamble that reiterate past UN resolutions and principles on the matter at hand, and after offering a polite nod to American previous efforts, there are twelve principles set forth in the resolution. The thirteenth clause merely says that the Security Council remains open for discussion. In other words, under the cover first of PA openness to further negotiations, followed, presumably, by UNSC openness to negotiations, the general principles of a peace agreement are intended to be etched in stone, or, at least, in history, as the basic terms for a peace agreement.
Clause 1 reiterates the traditional UN position on a two-state solution calling for an end to the Israeli occupation and a final peace agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians within mutually and internationally recognized borders. It requires that the second sovereign state come into being within one, not two, years, and that the Israeli occupation come to an end, but does not specify that the occupation end at the same time as the State of Palestine comes into being. The clause calls for the Palestinian state to be contiguous (the West Bank and Gaza?) and viable. Unlike earlier informal versions circulated that had not been blue-lined, this formal version did not call for the “founding” of two states as if Israel did not exist and would only come into being coterminous with the recognition of a Palestinian state.
Clause 2 sets forth the basic terms of the peace agreement to be reached by further negotiations: A. The borders will be based on the 4th of June 1967 borders, that is, the borders prior to the Six Day War fought between the 5th and 10th of June 1967 and not the internationally recognized borders of the 1923 Sykes-Picot line agreement, the proposed 1947 partition lines or the 1949 Armistice lines. Between 1949 and 4 June 1967, the borders on the ground became the de facto borders. Further, the new borders envision land swaps, presumably as negotiated in the Oslo process, but specifies that those land swaps are to be both limited and equivalent.

Basing the negotiations on the 4 June 1967 borders would mean that the old city of Jerusalem goes to Palestine, but Jerusalem is dealt with separately in the resolution. Palestine could insist on moving its border back onto the north-east quadrant of Lake Kinneret (Lake Tiberias), contrary to the 1923 historical border, giving Palestine equal rights to the waters of the lake. The Jordan River between Lake Kinneret and Lake Hula becomes the basis for a boundary. At that time, the main issues were riparian rights to the river and lake rather than control of the underground aquifers. (For a very helpful discussion of the 4 June 1967 borders see Frederic C. Hof, “The Line of June 4, 1967” (http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/67line.html). By implication, the Golan, annexed by Israel, goes back to Syria as well, presumably, including the Jewish settlement of Mishmar Ha-Yarden captured by Syria in the 1948 war.

B. There is a provision for third party peacekeeping and for ensuring that there is no terrorism, but Israel is given a deadline for ending its occupation in phases by the end of 1917.

C. In a phrasing adopted from the peace proposal of Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Abdullah, there will be a just and agreed solution for the Palestinian refugees based on resolution 194(III) without specifying a “right of return”; this implies compensation rather than return as the main route for resolving the Palestinian refugee issue.

D. Jerusalem is to be a common and shared capital for both countries and freedom of worship will be secured, a solution that goes beyond recognizing East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine and West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel with the old city left as a question mark, for a shared capital harks back to the UN resolution that proposed that Jerusalem remain united but internationalized or bi-lateralized in the current resolution. Further, Israel cannot even agree on “freedom of worship” among women, and men and among the various competing divisions within Judaism, so how can “freedom of worship” be guaranteed on the Temple Mount (Heb., Har Habayit; Arabic, Haram esh-Sharif)?

E. The resolution specifically points to water among other outstanding issues that will have to be settled.
Clauses 3 and 4 are both pro forma: 3) The Council agrees that the permanent agreement must immediately lead to an end of occupation and mutual recognition; 4) A timetable establishing the security arrangements through negotiation must be formed.

However, clause 5 is significant in welcoming Palestine as a full UN member. Up until recently, this was expected to be the heart of the resolution brought before the UNSC, a quest for permanent membership and, hence, recognition of Palestine as a state. The PA instead has decided to go for broke and place the UN membership issue within the framework of its position on a peace agreement. Since the US is promising a veto (which the PA had to know when they endorsed the resolution on Wednesday), it means that the Palestinians are going for a moral win beyond UN membership. The PA wants a formal resolution passed by at least 9 of 15 members of the UNSC supporting its position on a peace agreement and, thereby, implicitly legitimizing a position that both the US and Israel would not support. It prefers that moral victory more than full membership in the UN, though passage of this resolution will enhance its possibility of attaining that membership, especially if the timeframe is the end of 1917.

Half of the non-permanent members of the United Nations Security Council are re-elected each year. Though non-permanent or rotating members have no veto right, their combined votes can be very effective. Possibly 10 of the 15 members after 1 January 2015, when the vote is expected to take place, can be expected to support the resolution – China and Russia as permanent members and up to 8 of the 10 rotating members: Angola, Chad, Chile (likely), Jordan, Malaysia, Nigeria (likely), Spain (even though it beat out Turkey which would have certainly supported the resolution but, as pointed out in yesterday’s blog, has become more and more diplomatically isolated) and Venezuela. Only Japan and Lithuania of the rotating membership are in the “no” camp.

Angola takes its positions based on international law and the fundamental principle of self-determination. Malaysia, which already had wide sympathy because of the Malaysian МН17 Boeing crash, has positioned itself as the leading Muslim state opposed to Islamic State on ideological grounds. It convened a conference of leading experts on Muslim law which defined a Muslim state as one which guaranteed economic, political and social justice while the rights to life, freedom of religion, family, property, dignity and intellect are upheld. Recall further that most of the new members campaigned for their positions, not on simply a management of conflict agenda, but a conflict prevention agenda. On this plank, Spain was a leading proponent and backs up that position by providing peacekeeping troops. Venezuela, which campaigned on a platform of UN reform (President Nicolás Maduro called the charter of the UN high poetry), received unanimous support from Latin America and 182 out of 193 votes for its membership in spite of opposition by the United States. That means the resolution can be expected to get 9 and possibly even 10 votes in the UNSC before it is vetoed by the US.
The rest of the resolutions are expressions of motherhood:

6) The Council urges both sides to engage seriously and act together to guarantee peace and refrain from any act of incitement. Therefore, the council calls on all international states and organizations to support the negotiations with confidence-building measures.

7) The Council calls on all sides to stand behind their commitments to the International humanitarian law.

8) The Council encourages regional efforts to obtain peace in the Middle East, citing the Arab Peace Initiative as a reference.

9) The Council called for a new negotiating framework with the support of major stakeholders to help the parties reach an agreement in a timely way, beginning with holding a new international conference on the issue. The Council proposes assembling an international peace committee to launch negotiations. This has diplomatic significance for it removes the US from the leadership in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and search for peace and shifts it to the UN. Further, other countries are called upon to through the provision of political support as well as tangible support for post-conflict and peace-building arrangements.

10. Both sides are called on by the Council to refrain from taking one-sided, illegal steps, such as construction in settlements. (Note the indirect method of labeling the settlements as illegal.)

11. The Council urges both sides to immediately begin improving the unstable situation in the Gaza Strip and provide humanitarian aid through the different UN agencies.

12. The Council calls on the UN General Secretary to file a report stating the application of the decision within three months.

Note that there are no clauses calling for the release of prisoners.
Both the motives and strategy of the PA are clear. So is the reason for the US promising to veto the resolution as currently worded. The ground has been set for another negotiating route far more favourable to the Palestinians. But why did Jordan boast that its link with the US administration, with Congress and with the State Department is stronger than that of Israel? In the light of the swift promise of a veto, this seems a gross overreach.

I will try to answer this question in my next blog on Jordan.

Draft Resolution (17 December 2014)

Reaffirming its previous resolutions, in particular resolutions 242 (1967); 338 (1973), 1397 (2002), 1515 (2003), 1544 (2004), 1850 (2008), 1860 (2009) and the Madrid Principles,

Reiterating its vision of a region where two democratic states, Israel and Palestine, live side by side in peace within secure and recognized borders,

Reaffirming the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination,

Recalling General Assembly resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947,

Reaffirming the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force and recalling its resolutions 446 (1979), 452 (1979) and 465 (1980), determining, inter alia, that the policies and practices of Israel in establishing settlements in the territories occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, have no legal validity and constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East,

Affirming the imperative of resolving the problem of the Palestine refugees on the basis of international law and relevant resolutions, including resolution 194 (III), as stipulated in the Arab Peace Initiative,

Underlining that the Gaza Strip constitutes an integral part of the Palestinian territory occupied in 1967, and calling for a sustainable solution to the situation in the Gaza Strip, including the sustained and regular opening of its border crossings for normal flow of persons and goods, in accordance with international humanitarian law,

Welcoming the important progress in Palestinian state-building efforts recognised by the World Bank and the IMF in 2012 and reiterating its call to all States and international organizations to contribute to the Palestinian institution building programme in preparation for independence,

Reaffirming that a just, lasting and peaceful settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can only be achieved by peaceful means, based on an enduring commitment to mutual recognition, freedom from violence, incitement and terror, and the two-State solution, building on previous agreements and obligations and stressing that the only viable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an agreement that ends the occupation that began in 1967, resolves all permanent status issues as previously defined by the parties, and fulfils the legitimate aspirations of both parties,

Condemning all violence and hostilities directed against civilians and all acts of terrorism, and reminding all States of their obligations under resolution 1373 (2001),

Recalling the obligation to ensure the safety and well-being of civilians and ensure their protection in situations of armed conflict,

Reaffirming the right of all States in the region to live in peace within secure and internationally recognized borders,

Noting with appreciation the efforts of the United States in 2013/14 to facilitate and advance negotiations between the parties aimed at achieving a final peace settlement,

Aware of its responsibilities to help secure a long-term solution to the conflict,

1. Affirms the urgent need to attain, no later than 12 months after the adoption of this resolution, a just, lasting and comprehensive peaceful solution that brings an end to the Israeli occupation since 1967 and fulfills the vision of two independent, democratic and prosperous states, Israel and a sovereign, contiguous and viable State of Palestine living side by side in peace and security within mutually and internationally recognized borders;

2. Decides that the negotiated solution will be based on the following parameters:
– borders based on 4 June 1967 lines with mutually agreed limited, equivalent land swaps;
– security arrangements, including through a third-party presence, that guarantee and respect the sovereignty of a State of Palestine, including through a full and phased withdrawal of Israeli security forces which will end the occupation that began in 1967 over an agreed transition period in a reasonable timeframe, not to exceed the end of 2017, and that ensure the security of both Israel and Palestine through effective border security and by preventing the resurgence of terrorism and effectively addressing security threats, including emerging and vital threats in the region.
– A just and agreed solution to the Palestine refugee question on the basis of Arab Peace initiative, international law and relevant United Nations resolutions, including resolution 194 (III);
– Jerusalem as the shared capital of the two States which fulfils the legitimate aspirations of both parties and protects freedom of worship;
– an agreed settlement of other outstanding issues, including water;

3. Recognizes that the final status agreement shall put an end to the occupation and an end to all claims and lead to immediate mutual recognition;

4. Affirms that the definition of a plan and schedule for implementing the security arrangements shall be placed at the center of the negotiations within the framework established by this resolution;

5. Looks forward to welcoming Palestine as a full Member State of the United Nations within the timeframe defined in the present resolution;

6. Urges both parties to engage seriously in the work of building trust and to act together in the pursuit of peace by negotiating in good faith and refraining from all acts of incitement and provocative acts or statements, and also calls upon all States and international organizations to support the parties in confidence-building measures and to contribute to an atmosphere conducive to negotiations;

7. Calls upon all parties to abide by their obligations under international humanitarian law, including the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949;

8. Encourages concurrent efforts to achieve a comprehensive peace in the region, which would unlock the full potential of neighborly relations in the Middle East and reaffirms in this regard the importance of the full implementation of the Arab Peace Initiative;

9. Calls for a renewed negotiation framework that ensures the close involvement, alongside the parties, of major stakeholders to help the parties reach an agreement within the established timeframe and implement all aspects of the final status, including through the provision of political support as well as tangible support for post-conflict and peace-building arrangements, and welcomes the proposition to hold an international conference that would launch the negotiations;

10. Calls upon both parties to abstain from any unilateral and illegal actions, including settlement activities, that could undermine the viability of a two-State solution on the basis of the parameters defined in this resolution;

11. Calls for immediate efforts to redress the unsustainable situation in the Gaza Strip, including through the provision of expanded humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian civilian population via the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and other United Nations agencies and through serious efforts to address the underlying issues of the crisis, including consolidation of the ceasefire between the parties;

12. Requests the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of this resolution every three months;

13. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

Partition and a Two-State Solution.11.04.13

Partition and a Two-State Solution 11.04.13

by

Howard Adelman

Last evening I went to hear Derek Penslar and Cliff Orwin at Holy Blossom Temple to "debate" the topic, "Is a Two-State Solution Possible? Desirable?" But it was not a debate. It was a discussion. Both speakers agreed that a two-state solution was desirable. Both also agreed that such a solution was not possible in the near future. They differed in the perspective from which they approached the issue and the degree, source and nature of their pessimism.

Derek Penslar spoke first focusing on the concept of partition. Derek is a comparative historian of modern European Jewry, Zionism and Israel. From 2002 until last year, he held the Samuel J. Zacks Chair in Jewish History at the University of Toronto and, from 2002-2008, directed U of T’s Centre for Jewish Studies. He is currently the Stanley Lewis Professor of Israel Studies at Oxford University. Derek’s historical sketch of the concept of partition in the history of Zionist thought and political action allowed him to approach the topic of a Two-State Solution through its central idea – one land divided between two people.

He began with the original vision of Zionism at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. At that time, Zionist thinkers had no clear conception of borders let alone of a Palestinian nation with which to share the land. Only with the removal by the British of Transjordan in 1921 from the definition of Palestine and the fixing of the borders with Syria, Lebanon and Egypt did Palestine finally have distinct boundaries — though revisionist Zionists would erroneously insist for decades that the land east of the Jordan still belonged to Palestine.

The concept of partition was first raised in the Peel Commission appointed in response to the Arab revolt or terrorism at the time. The Commission was charged with investigating the causes of the unrest and grievances of Arabs or Jews without bringing into question the fundamental terms of the Mandate. Sir Reginald Coupland, a member of the commission, who was a professor at Oxford University where Derek now teaches and an expert in both colonial history and nationalistic politics, introduced the possibility of partition. (Except for Sir Harold Morris, Chairman of the Industrial Court in Britain and a member of the House of Commons for the Liberals from 1922-1923, the other three members of the Commission were all very experienced colonialists: Sir Horace Rumbold, an experienced politician and diplomat, Sir Laurie Hammond, a former Indian Civil Servant, and Sir William Morris Carter, an ex-Colonial Chief Justice with in-depth experience in Rhodesia and Kenya.)

Derek did not have time to go into the details of the Peel Commission Report, but it is helpful if a few of its highlights are mentioned. First, the Commission was a unanimous report that did question the fundamental terms of the Mandate and recommended that it be terminated in the interests of a "lasting settlement". Second, the Report insisted that there was no prospect of fusion or assimilation between Jewish and Arab cultures even in a federated state. "The gulf between the races is thus already wide and will continue to widen if the present Mandate is maintained." Third, the plan of partition involved three, not two entities, a Jewish state (the Galilee, the Jezreel Valley, most of Beisan and all of the coastal plain from Rosh Hanikra to Beer-Tuvia), an Arab state in the rest of Palestine west of the Jordan River that would be united with Transjordan, and a British enclave (Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Nazareth) and temporarily, until ceded to the Jewish state, Haifa, Acre, Tiberias and Safed.

Population factors were also issues — including exchanges, migration, reproduction rates and characteristics. Thus, the plan recommended a population exchange to deal with the 250,000 Arabs within the proposed Jewish state and 500 Jews within the Arab state consistent with the Nansen conception of "unmixing" ethnic groups and forced exchange of populations, a doctrine of ethnic cleansing that became preeminent between the two world wars and immediately after WWII to deal with what was then called the "minority problem". (See Ch. 2 in Howard Adelman and Elazar Barkan (2011) No Return, No Refuge, Columbia University Press.) Section 10 of chapter xxii of the Peel Commission Report, “Exchange of Land and Population,” recommended that "there should be a transfer of land, and as far as possible, an exchange of population.”

Fifth, the Jewish nation was depicted as a highly educated, democratic community for which existence as a crown colony was unsuitable while the passion and intensity behind Arab nationalism made colonial government extremely difficult if not impossible. Finally, given the closing down of immigration to the United States, the persecution of Jews in Germany and Poland, pressures for immigration by Jews to Palestine were powerful but understandably resisted by Arabs bent on self-determination and unwilling to be swamped by a Jewish majority while the growth of the Arab population, because of a high birth rate, placed an opposite pressure on Jewish national self-determination.

As Derek said, Coupland reversed his position when it came to India. What he did not add – again probably because of time – is that Professor Coupland changed, not because he later rejected the idea of partition and exchange of populations, but because he thought that it was not practicable for India. Partition there would involve millions of people, exchanged over great distances, with no natural dividing lines in a population so intermixed. There was the impossible problem of dealing with Sikhs.

In Israel, both before independence and after, Herut rejected partition and kept insisting that Jordan east of the river was part of the original Palestine. Two of the three parties that came together to form the Labour Party also opposed partition. Ben Gurion, who came from Mapai, was equivocal. Partition was accepted, not because the Zionists believed it was a good idea, but because of pragmatics. Whatever land they agreed to "surrender" in the whole of Palestine, would go to Jordan.

In 1967, everything changed. Israel had just given up being an occupying power with respect to Israeli Arabs. In 1967, Israel became an occupying power of Arabs in Gaza and the West Bank, not because of any plan to do so, though the desire, hope and aspiration were there, but because of circumstances. With the Palestinians opposed to a two-state solution and many Israeli politicians not disposed to accept a Palestinian and a Jewish state side-by-side in the area west of the Jordan, partition was not possible.

Partition became possible in the late 1980s. Mark Heller and Sari Nusseibeh in No Trumpets, No Drums: A Two-State Settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in 1991 offered the solution. As Sari once told me, in 1988 the PLO had given him permission to put forth this proposed change in the Palestinian position. Further, in a press conference in Geneva on 14 December 1988, Yasser Arafat, head of the PLO, renounced terrorism and stated that all parties in the Middle East conflict had the right to exist in peace and security, including the states of Palestine and Israel. 
On 9 September 1993, this was followed up with the PLO exchange of letters between Arafat and the Prime Minister of Israel in which the PLO recognized the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security, accepted United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, agreed to the resolution of all outstanding issues in the conflict between the two sides through negotiations and exclusively peaceful means, renounced the use of terrorism and all other acts of violence, assumed responsibility over all PLO elements and personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent violations, and agreed to discipline violators. That exchange of letters formally ended the hostilities of the uprising of the Palestinians against occupation that was known as the first intifada that had started in 1987. 
The Palestinian Authority came into existence as a result of that historic agreement with the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements of 1993. These were followed by the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip of 1995, the Palestinian National Council decision in April of 1996 to cancel the articles of its Charter that were contrary to the 1993 exchange of letters, and the Wye River Memorandum of 1998 in which Arafat wrote President Clinton affirming that, "all of the provisions of the Covenant which are inconsistent with the P.L.O. commitment to recognize and live in peace side by side with Israel are no longer in effect. As a result, Articles 6-10, 15, 19-23, and 30 have been nullified, and the parts in Articles 1-5, 11-14, 16-18, 25-27 and 29 that are inconsistent with the above mentioned commitments have also been nullified."
Derek then side-tracked to refer to a number of other quasi-states that had been created by de facto partition: Cyprus, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) in Azerbaijan, Abkhaziand. South Ossetia in Georgia, and he could have mentioned Kosovo in Serbia. He then took up the moves on the Israeli side following the breakthroughs on the acceptance of partition on the Palestinian side. With the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, they came much later.
At Annapolis in November 2007, the PLO, Israel and the USA agreed on a two-state solution as the basis for negotiations. On 14 June 2009, Benjamin Netanyahu at Bar Ilan University finally endorsed the establishment of a Palestinian state west of the Jordan River -- conditional on Palestine not controlling its borders, that it be demilitarized, not control its airspace, or have foreign relations with any state that did not recognize Israel, renounce the right of return and recognize Israel as a Jewish state. 

Derek then went into the issue of settlements. In 1988 when this dialectical dance of partition and mutual recognition had begun, the West Bank’s settler population was 63,000. Today it is 350,000 with another 200,000 living in the enlarged Jerusalem basin. In Derek’s narrative, up until the 1990s, the Israeli leadership was characterized as ideological zealots but real life pragmatists. Since then, that position had become inverted; they had become ideological moderates but the zealots on the ground had established the new political facts.

The historical sketch did not allow much room for optimism.

Cliff Orwin was introduced as a Straussian political philosopher and former student of Allan Bloom teaching at the University of Toronto with a keen interest in the Middle East. He focused on the prospective future rather than the past and insisted that though partition and the Two-State Solution was desirable, it was not feasible in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, various versions of a one state solution were impossible. The two-state solution was the desirable alternative because national self-determination was now the international norm. Israel was a liberal democracy and that ethos may permit occupation of another people but not on a long term basis. Occupation was a drag on security. Israel accepted its responsibilities to the international community seriously.

However, though desirable, such a solution was not feasible at this time. The two sides had incompatible aims. Further, the most powerful force in political life was inertia; without a powerful incentive for change, drift was the most likely prospect. Further, Israel was faced with far more impending issues including the irreversible Islamicization of the region, the world wide efforts to delegitimize Israel and the Iranian nuclear threat. Of those three, partition would only address the second.

For Cliff, Obama’s speeches and Kerry’s shuttling around were both irrelevant phenomena with respect to having any impact in bringing partition to a conclusion. Further, partition itself was no guarantee of stability and one could envision a much more unstable situation if the risk was taken of establishing a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza. Nevertheless, Cliff thought that each side could take steps in the interim to prepare for the day when such a solution could be implemented.

Plans for the long term on the Palestinian side could include a renunciation of the right of return, redrawing its educational maps to show Israel, ceasing to treat terrorists as heroes, ending its invective against Zionism, continuing the building of the institutions of government. Israel could cease the expansion of the settlements and improve the situation of Palestinians both within Israel and in the West Bank and continually signal its readiness for a two state solution. Essentially, as Derek noted, Cliff had painted a picture of congealment. Derek, on the other hand, pointed to the possibility of a third intifada in the air and history’s tale of sudden and unpredictable seismic shifts. Israelis were approaching a half century of occupation. Two generations of Israelis had grown up as occupiers and Derek feared the undemocratic forces threatening Israel as a democratic state.

It was obvious from the audience responses in questions and the discussion that the audience had been left in a despondent move about the prospects of implementing a two-state solution in the foreseeable future. Did a resurrection of the Arab peace initiative offer some hope? What about the prospects of economic investments of Israelis in the West Bank and the increase of civil society involvement? What about the possibility of unilateral withdrawal by Israel and moving back to a self-defined border leaving the final solution to be negotiated separately? The first was treated as an important but largely irrelevant side issue, even with Kerry’s efforts to tweak the Arab proposal to make it more acceptable to Israel. As Derek said in response to the second suggestion, economics influence politics but in the end peace is a political decision about power. As for unilateral moves by Israel, the response was that Israel was unlikely to take any such initiatives; it had been left traumatized by the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza.

I myself was not left in a pessimistic mood but was interested in the way academic analysis contributed and reinforced inertia. I had not been able to raise my questions which would have focused on Cliff’s false simplistic dichotomy of either a two-state deal or virtually nothing except for the unilateral confidence building and institutional proposals he offered. There was no discussion about the progress underway to ease the checkpoints and interference in Palestinian daily life in Area B and the larger possibility of creating and strengthening a de facto partition of the ground. Nor was there any discussion of the forces working the other way to push towards a solution much more quickly than Cliff suggested or relying on a seismic event to change the situation as Derek suggested. After all, the efforts of Obama and Kerry were not just superficial irrelevencies but a distinct change in approach to tactical moves rather than a head on assault pushing for a two state solution. Europe has signalled Israel that Israel could not develop the Leviathan gas fields and establish the pipelines and infrastructure for exporting gas to Europe unless meaningful progress had been made in moving towards a two-state solution. Further, given the new policies towards the Arab-Israeli sector and the shifts already underway among Palestinian Israelis, one could envision 20% of the Israeli population playing a much more positive and creative role in pushing a two-state solution.

As erudite as Derek always is and as brilliant as Cliff was in bring his pessimistic Straussian perspective on the perpetual condition of humanity to bear on the problem, I found the array of detailed omissions and trends in the current context to be more revealing than what was actually said.

Partition.Two-State.Solution.11.04.13.doc