UNHRC Report.2014 Gaza WAR.I.Mandate

The UNHRC Report on the 2014 Gaza War

Part I: Mandate

by

Howard Adelman

The basic question is whether a) the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) was operating outside of its mandate field or its field of supposed expertise, and b) in setting up a commission of inquiry, its own presumptions about human rights law, for which it has a clear mandate, deformed in any way the application of humanitarian law in its analysis of the 2014 Gaza War.

On 24 June 2015, the United Nations Independent Commission of Inquiry on the 2014 Gaza Conflict delivered its report (A/HRC/29/52) (UN Gaza War 2014). The commission was set up by the UNHRC and the report was delivered as agenda item 7 under the more general heading, “Human rights situation in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories.” One year earlier, on 23 June 2014, when the Gaza war was still underway, the UNHRC adopted resolution A/HRC/RES/S-21/1 to establish the independent, international commission of inquiry to investigate all violations of international humanitarian law (my italics) and international human rights law in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, particularly in the occupied Gaza Strip, in the context of the military operations conducted since 13 June 2014, and to report to the Council at its twenty-eighth session in March 2015. The report was delivered only three months late. The mandate read as follows:

“Ensuring respect for international law (my italics) in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem”, the United Nations Human Rights Council requested the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to “to urgently dispatch an independent, international commission of inquiry, to be appointed by the President of the Human Rights Council, to investigate all violations of international humanitarian law (my italics) and international human rights law in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, particularly in the occupied Gaza Strip, in the context of the military operations conducted since 13 June 2014, whether before, during or after, to establish the facts and circumstances of such violations and of the crimes perpetrated and to identify those responsible, to make recommendations, in particular on accountability measures, all with a view to avoiding and ending impunity and ensuring that those responsible are held accountable, and on ways and means to protect civilians against any further assaults (my italics), and to report to the Council at its twenty-eighth session”.

However, the United Nations never mandated the UNHRC itself to investigate humanitarian law. Human rights, yes. Humanitarian law, no. Humanitarian law is not mentioned once in the long resolution of 15 March 2006 setting up the United Nations Human Rights Council to replace the United Nations Commission on Human Rights which had fallen into total disrepute. According to the website of the Commission as well as the UNHRC, the Commission of Inquiry interprets this mandate as including investigating the activities of Palestinian armed groups in Gaza, including attacks on Israel, as well as the Israeli military operation in the Gaza Strip and Israeli actions in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, by looking into a broad range of alleged violations committed by all parties under the full range of human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights. [Note that humanitarian law is not mentioned in this section.]

Here again, Res. A/60/251 setting up UNHRC does refer to regional groupings of states and especially individual states, but nowhere can we find any mention of armed groups, military, violence, etc. The UNHRC was mandated to strengthen the promotion and protection of human rights around the globe, that is, the rights of individuals in relationship to the states in which they live or of which they may be members. The UNHRC was not given responsibility for protecting all aspects of international law, but only those aspects having to do with the relationship between states and its citizens or individuals living on the soil governed by a state. Two overlapping realms of international law – refugee law and humanitarian law – deal respectively with the rights of individuals who are not members of a state that provides for their protection and for the laws governing the initiation and conduct of war. Yet the mandate, now as specifically interpreted by the Commission, was to look into the actions of Palestinian armed groups in Gaza, including attacks on Israel, as well as the Israeli military operation in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and East Jerusalem as a part of the West Bank.

Under humanitarian law, this would mean investigating what happens to prisoners of war, how the wounded are treated, how military personnel are treated, and how and whether the state makes a strong effort to distinguish between civilian and military personnel. When we examine the report in detail, it will be interesting to see what aspects of humanitarian law are covered and which are not. We are, however, no longer surprised that the UNHRC would decide to investigate the protections afforded civilians and the permitted military means used in the 2014 Gaza War. After all, five years earlier, on 12 January 2009, under almost similar wording, the UNHRC set up what came to be known as the Goldstone Commission.

The difference in wording is interesting. Resolution S-9/1 setting up the Goldstone Commission in 2009 decided to: “dispatch an urgent, independent international fact-finding mission, to be appointed by the President of the Council, to investigate all violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law (my italics) by the occupying Power, Israel, against the Palestinian people throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly in the occupied Gaza Strip, due to the current aggression, and calls upon Israel not to obstruct the process of investigation and to fully cooperate with the mission.” What a difference five years can make! Unlike the Goldstone Report, which was found to be so flawed, even by Richard Goldstone himself after it was published, the 2014 mandate mentions both belligerents and not just one (Israel) and does not restrict the investigation to Palestinian territories. The 2014 mandate does not predefine the war as unjust on the part of Israel by referring to the “current aggression” by Israel. In a more subtle shift, the reference to humanitarian law in the Goldstone Commission mandate followedthe investigation of the application of human rights law. In the 2014 mandate, the reference to humanitarian law precedes the reference to human rights law.

Recall that Mary Robinson, who eventually supported Richard Goldstone’s Report, partially because of her respect for him, and who had been the first person approached to head the 2009 Commission, refused to take the position as head of the 2009 Commission because the mandate was so one-sided and had been “guided not by human rights but by politics.”  Richard Goldstone himself, before taking the position, complained of its failure to take into account the actions of all parties in the conflict and informally received approval by the President that the Commission could broaden its mandate. However, the broadening seemed peripheral and, in any case, the UNHRC ignored the recommendation applicable to Hamas. Thus, Goldstone’s insistence that the informal broadening and the fact that his initiative received no objections at a plenary session of UNHRC was sufficient, proved incorrect, as did his chastisement of Hillary Clinton for her “tiresome and inept” criticisms of the one-sided nature of the mandate. This could not be done with the 2014 mandate which formally required the mission to look at all parties: Israel; the Palestinian Authority; Hamas, which governs Gaza; and other armed Palestinian groups. The two mandates, however, are similar in covering the West Bank, said to include East Jerusalem instead of being referred to as a separate entity, though the violent conflict did not take place there.

In 2009, Richard Goldstone in presenting his report said that he and his fellow commissioners had been motivated by four goals:

  • To uphold the principle of the rule of law and, more particularly, humanitarian and human rights law
  • To ensure the protection of civilians during armed conflict to the greatest extent possible
  • To ensure that no state or armed group should remain immune from accountability and justice
  • Finally,“out of a deep concern for the hundreds of civilians who needlessly died and those who suffered injury and dislocation of their lives.”

The key question in the 2014 inquiry would be the same. Were civilians “to the greatest extent possible” protected during an armed conflict? The question was not, were civilians protected to a reasonable degree in accordance with the laws of war? Because humanitarian law does not require that civilians be protected to the greatest extent possible, for, in the end, that would entail not going to war at all by either side. Killing per se is unlawful under human rights law. However, under humanitarian law, killing combatants is not unlawful and even the killing of civilians is permitted under the situation of “collateral damage” where deaths of civilians are permitted under the principle of proportionality, which is not about protecting civilians to the greatest extent possible, but requires balancing the incidental loss of civilian life or injury to civilians in relationship to the concrete and direct military advantage expected from a particular attack. In other words, it is not about the numbers killed relative to one another on each side, but whether those civilian deaths were proportionate to the military goals being pursued.

There is also an overlap between humanitarian and refugee law. Some of the norms applicable to the Gaza War require:

  1. If the territory is legally an occupied territory, the prohibition under the Fourth Geneva Convention of individual or mass forcible transfers, both within the occupied territory and beyond its borders; there is an exception – an occupying power is permitted  to “evacuate” the inhabitants of a particular area if this is necessary for the security of the civilian population or for imperative military reasons;
  2. Attacking belligerents is permitted, but attacking civilians and civilian property indiscriminately is prohibited;
  3. The duty to spare the civilian population as much as is feasible;
  4. The prohibition of reprisals against either the civilian population and its property.
  5. Permitting an unhindered passage of relief supplies and assistance.

Who investigates, how they investigate and the intellectual frame they use to conduct that investigation will determine, in large part, the outcome. To take up the latter point, in international studies a definitive distinction is made between humanitarian law, refugee law and human rights law. These three spheres overlap in their application, but the distinction does not. Human rights law deals with a state’s relationship to its citizens and other foreigners on its soil focusing on the protections of civilians from any oppression by a state. Refugee law deals with the rights of individuals who lack membership in a state that will protect them and are outside their state of normal residence, but, in situations of failing or disintegrating states, may even be living within their national home. Humanitarian law deals with the conduct of war, more particularly, though certainly not only, the protection of civilians affected by armed conflict. Unlike humanitarian law, which can never be suspended, some human rights treaties permit states to derogate from certain rights in times of public emergency and suspend certain key rights, including the right to life and the prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

The three spheres are said to overlap and complement each other. But, in reality, they are also at odds. After all, in war, targeting anyone for death, even if the person is a soldier, cannot be part of human rights law which, as interpreted in the last two decades, even restricts states from taking the lives of their own citizens even in cases of very heinous crimes. So it is very difficult to look at military behaviour through a military lens of humanitarian law if the primary glasses used are to assist in viewing that behaviour in terms of human rights violations. It is akin to using reading glasses to allow one to see distances more clearly.

Now it is well known that three agencies were set up to educate and monitor behaviour in each of these three fields – the UNHRC for human rights law, the UNHCR (High Commission) for refugee law, and the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) for humanitarian law. So how come the UNHRC seems to be poaching on ICRC territory? One reason is conceptual.  ICRC in its 2005 statement on its own mandate, stated that, “International humanitarian law, refugee law and human rights law are complementary bodies of law that share a common goal, the protection of the lives, health and dignity of persons. They form a complex network of complementary protections and it is essential that we understand how they interact.” However, that is not how a coterie of human rights lawyers, researchers and professional actors who have made human rights their specialty, view it. For them, human rights is all encompassing and humanitarian law and refugee law are but specialized divisions of human rights law. The three fields are not related as overlapping, but one field is all-encompassing while the other two are subordinate.

But the rivalry is not just conceptual. This is quite evident. The UNHRC states unequivocally its imperial position: the UNHRC defines itself explicitly as the “principal human rights official of the United Nations.” But it is not the principal humanitarian law official of the international system. The ICRC, an organization much older than the UN itself, is. Yet the UNHRC saw no need to seek out the ICRC to forge a partnership to investigate the violent conflict in Gaza, or, for that matter, to cite the ICRC very much in its report. There is another reason, for the ICRC, unlike UNHRC, does not have a close relationship with any human rights organization, but particularly with the UNHRC which lacks a field presence. Further, human rights organizations define themselves as outspoken and, therefore, by their very nature, they speak out. ICRC, in contrast, has a confidential modus operandi.

But this does not explain why, of the 680 paragraphs and 1255 footnotes, ICRC is only referred to in 18 of them, that is just under 1%. Though ICRC was present and active in Gaza throughout the whole conflict, ICRC is only cited three times for evidence, each time with respect to Israeli behaviour – targeting civilians in an UNRWA school, targeting ambulance drivers and targeting the Gaza power plant. There is not one citation that says anything positive about Israel by the ICRC and no references to ICRC observations re Hamas conduct.

In addition to the three specific observational and interpretive issues, ICRC is cited three times with respect to two issues, the Palestinians aiming missiles at Israel, and here only to note that since the missiles could not be aimed properly, this would clearly be a mitigating circumstance in the degree to which they could found to be at fault. There are also two citations concerning Israel as an Occupying Power, not to discuss the legal issues raised, but to simply support the view that Israel has been an occupying power long before it invaded Gaza and even after it withdrew its troops.

The other 12 citations refer to ICRC as the definitive reference point on international humanitarian law, therefore granting in reality what they take away conceptually and concretely in the behaviour of UNHRC. Further, as the leading authority on humanitarian law, ICRC makes itself available to offer advice, particularly to the UNHRC, on the basic principles and guidelines applicable to various situations of alleged humanitarian law regulations. Why was so little attention paid to ICRC when it is clearly the most respected and widely recognized protector of humanitarian law as well as one of the most respected humanitarian organizations in the world? Most importantly, it is THE organization mandated under international law, including the Geneva Conventions, to both interpret humanitarian law and to protect the victims of armed conflict, including those wounded in war, combatants taken prisoner, the forcibly displaced and, most importantly for this report, the responsibility for protecting civilians and other non-combatants. Given ICRC’s well-known criticisms of some of Israel’s conduct, it could not be because ICRC is biased in favour of Israel. But ICRC is biased in favour of humanitarian law as a distinctive field, though overlapping with human right law, occupying a distinctly separate niche in international law.

In this analysis I will eventually discuss the key legal issues and the observations and interpretations of specific incidents where each of the belligerents were or could be found to be at fault. I will also compare the citations of ICRC compared to those attributed to such NGO human rights organizations as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch who also presumptively assume a responsibility for humanitarian law, but almost always within a human rights frame. I will also question why the foremost authorities on applied humanitarian law are not cited or drawn upon for their experience in the application of international humanitarian law, namely the views of various Western armed forces on the ethical conduct of the war in accordance with international humanitarian law.

Just because the UNHRC is not the first among equals when it comes to humanitarian law, and just because it places international humanitarian law in a subordinate position to international human rights law, and just because its citations of the ICRC are so few, and even those few are feeble, does not mean that the United Nations Independent Commission of Inquiry on the 2014 Gaza Conflict could not conduct a proper investigation and deliver an excellent report. Certainly even on a cursory reading, it is much superior to the Goldstone report. If the Goldstone Report was worthy only of an E, a complete failure, a cursory reading of this report on the 2014 Gaza War appears to deserve at least a passing grade. Whether it will be a bare pass, a good pass or an excellent one will have to await our analysis.

One last word about the UNHRC’s own mandate and the mandate assigned to its commission. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the principles of which UNHRC is mandated to uphold, itself suggests that UNHRC in conducting this inquiry strayed both well outside its comfort zone as well as its responsibilities to the international community. For example, echoing Immanuel Kant, the preamble of that Declaration states unequivocally that its foundation is not only freedom and justice, but peace. Further, Article 3 states clearly that, “Everyone had the right to life, liberty and security of person.” War contradicts that and claims that belligerents have no right to life and no right to security, with the exception of the protection of civilians so long as that is possible given the strategies each side adopts. War by definition is a violation of human rights. But the Declaration is not concerned with violent conflict, either the reasons for going to war or the conduct of the war. It is concerned with such old standbys as freedom of speech, of assembly, as well as the new economic freedoms enunciated since the Universal Declaration was adopted. The latter document clearly refers to its mandate as focused on a state in relationship to individuals over whom it has charge.

International humanitarian law is about the conduct of states or quasi-state entities as they do battle, and primarily about the protection of individuals. Human rights are also about the protection of individuals. Those rights make up a very long list. However, by the time you get to Article 29 of the Declaration, the clear aspiration is peace. Article 28 reads: “Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.” Clearly that is aspirational since international order is stated as a precondition for the full realization of human rights. Yet the Declaration does not attend to the question of how an international peaceable kingdom can be established. The foundation of human rights law and international humanitarian law are fundamentally distinct.

If human rights are based on the universal declaration of 1948, international humanitarian law is based on the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two additional protocols of 1977, as well as a number of specific treaties, such as Conventions on the use of specific weapons – such as phosphorous or poison gas – Conventions on the protection of cultural property during violent conflict, and all of these as interpreted by international jurisprudence. International law governs the initiation and conduct of armed conflict even if nowhere in the law is armed conflict defined. But somehow, we all seem to know what it is even when it is not defined. And certainly there was no dispute that humanitarian law applied to the Gaza conflict. However, just to be clear, the ICRC qualifies a situation of violence and then “sends a memorandum to the parties concerned setting out their obligations under international humanitarian law and offers its services.”

What constitutes an “unlawful killing” in situations of armed conflict must be assessed on the basis of the relevant rules of international humanitarian law, including the fact that combatants or other persons taking a direct part in hostilities may be attacked – even with lethal force; and that killing of civilians in certain circumstances must be assessed pursuant to international humanitarian law’s principle of proportionality which requires a balancing of the incidental loss of civilian life or injury to civilians with the concrete and direct military advantage expected from a particular attack.

I will pay a great deal of attention to the application of this principle by the Commission the objectivity and expertise of which depends in good part on the expertise and mental frameworks of the Commissioners.

Next blog: The Commissioners

William Schabas: Was He Pushed or Did He Jump?

William Schabas: Was He Pushed or Did He Jump?

by

Howard Adelman

On Tuesday, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called for scrapping the U.N. commission looking into Israeli actions last summer in Gaza since the Geneva-based U.N. Human Rights Council is an “anti-Israeli body” that had a proven track record of doing nothing about true human rights violations around the world. So why submit evidence to undermine the Chair of an inquiry into the last Gaza War at this time? And why submit it to the UNHRC and not just to the media?

In answer to the latter question, Israel lends some legitimacy to the UNHRC in submitting its information to it. At the same time, Israel wins brownie points with the UNHRC by giving the UNHRC 2-3 days advantage before the issue and the new evidence became public. Further, Israel recognizes that it cannot stop the inquiry. Israel will criticize the results, but this initiative gives the appearance of being less subversive of the proceedings of the UNHRC. No matter what the report says, because of the extreme bias of its sponsors and the absence of Israeli cooperation, any inquiry is bound to be seriously compromised. But, in the end, Israel would prefer a report that was less rather than more unfavourable. For the report becomes a reference point over time and not Israel’s denunciations. Since the report is at the writing and not the investigative stage, Israel would prefer a report less anti-Israel than one written by Bill which Israeli professionals saw as the most likely result.

I believe the key reason is to be found in the announcement of Rolando Gómez, a spokesman for the U.N. Human Rights Council, that accompanied the information on Bill Schabas’ resignation that current commission member Mary McGowan Davis would replace Schabas as chair and not Doudou Diène who, with his post-colonialist mindset and conviction that Israel is a late colonial outpost of the West, would be even more anti-Israel than Schabas. Davis was a third late appointment announced on 25 August, whereas William Schabas and Doudou Diène’s appointments were announced two weeks earlier on 11 August. This was a result of the farcical announcement by the UNHRC that Amal Alamuddin, a British-Lebanese lawyer and George Clooney’s then fiancée and now wife, was the third appointee. Amal Alamuddin issued a press release the next day insisting that she had never agreed to sit on the inquiry. The head of UNHRC, Navi Pillay, was left with mud all over her face.

Davis is a former prosecutor from New York, has been a New York Supreme Court judge (1986-1998) and has served the UN in a number of legal capacities – working to strengthen the public defender’s office in Afghanistan in 2004 and 2005 to mentor and to hone the analytical and trial advocacy skills of Afghan lawyers representing detainees in the local prisons. In the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, she served as a consultant and offered trial advocacy training programs for prosecutors there. Her CV also lists her as doing work in Cambodia and Sierra Leone, but I do not know what she did on the crimes against humanities, human rights abuses and the war crimes investigations there. One of her very interesting observations is that, “courts that operate beneath the radar screen like this one in Kamituga (in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) are of equal or, perhaps, greater value” than the formal court system.

Her experience, however, culminated in her own post-Goldstone investigation of whether Israel had conducted satisfactory investigations of all charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity in the previous Gaza War. She had strenuously insisted that her inquiry had not been influenced by the Goldstone Report and was entirely independent. “Our work was completely separate from his work.” Her strenuous and adamant insistence on separating her report from that of the Goldstone Inquiry was the first initial promising sign that it might be fair.

McGowan Davis and Swedish Judge Lennart Aspergren (who served on the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda) also submitted their report to the United Nations Human Rights Council, but insisted that it was vastly different from the Goldstone effort. Even though they did hold hearings with victims of Israeli and Palestinian violence, their report was not intended and did not investigate Israeli military action in Gaza. Their mandate was to investigate and evaluate the respective Israeli and Palestinian investigations of claims of human rights abuses. The report began by praising the Turkel Commission inquiry into abuses in the May 2010 flotilla raid and the outstanding quality of that report which proved that Israel was capable of great impartiality and zealotry, even probing high-level decision making.

However, the inquiries into the conduct of the IDF in Operation Cast Lead did not match that standard. Of 400 investigations of claims of operational misconduct, few led to disciplinary action. Of 14 investigations into human rights violations, only two led to criminal charges. Further, right up until the publication of their report, Israel had not probed executive decisions related to Operation Cast Lead. Davis and Aspergen also criticized Israel for tardiness and lack of transparency. The report made no recommendations on reference to the International Criminal Court, but the UNHRC used the report to refer Israeli action in Operation Cast lead to the ICC.

Given the possible explanation that Israel wanted to see McGowan Davis replace him as chair, why did Bill resign, not only as chair but as a commissioner, for he then will have no input into the writing of the report? The following different reasons have been proffered for the resignation:

  1. The Protection Rationale

1.      Bill’s work in defence of human rights made him a huge target for malicious attacks, and this was but part of those attacks.

2.      “The situation in the committee became unbearable and I did not want the personal attacks of Netanyahu and Lieberman to detract from the truth, which will give justice to the victims.”

3.      “I resigned so that the personal attacks from Netanyahu and Lieberman do not affect the report itself”

4.      Schabas resigned so that the personal attacks by Netanyahu and Lieberman do not affect how the Report is received.

B.     The Impact on the Process and Work of the Inquiry

1.      The Israeli filing of the information led to the Human Rights Council’s executive on Monday seeking legal advice about his position from U.N. headquarters. In making this reference, customary practice requires stepping aside until the legal opinion is received.

2.      “I believe that it is difficult for the work to continue while a procedure is underway to consider whether the chair of the commission should be removed.”

  1. The claims from Israel that he was not objective led to the development of an investigation by the UNHRC, and this investigation led to his resignation.
  2. The resignation was the result of “the huge pressure Israel and the Zionist lobby put on the committee and its chairman” according to Hamas spokesman, Fawzi Barhoum; Palestinian official Hanan Ashrawi decried the Israeli efforts as “typical Israeli tactics” in which, “They try to intimidate, they try to slander, they try to discredit, they make it extremely difficult for anybody to take any position that would hold Israel accountable or investigating Israeli violations or Israeli war crimes.” Barhoum added that the Israeli pressure “is meant for impunity and killing the truth.”

Bill viewed his resignation as necessary to protect human rights, ensure justice for the victims (of Israel), protect the report and protect how the report is received. But it is difficult to see how his resignation could be helpful in any of these respects. Certainly, the resignation removes a distraction for the work of the commission, but how does it enhance human rights, victims’ justice, the report itself or its reception? Ironically, the latter two claims may have a degree of accuracy. For, I believe, in McGowan Davis’ hands, the report will both read more impartially, be more judicious and be received better even though Netanyahu and company are bound to jump on it no matter who writes the report or what it says. Thus, the report is likely to receive, relatively at least, a better reception. This may not have been Bill’s intention when offering the reasons for his resignation, but I suggest that this was both the reason for the Israeli action and the result of Bill’s resignation.

On the impact of the resignation on the process rather than substance of the inquiry, I see not one whit of truth that this was an exercise in political pressure or Israeli intimidation and such charges only discredit the people who make it. Israel not only had a right but a duty to present its evidence. Whether the evidence was sufficient to establish a conflict of interest is another thing. The resignation had nothing to do with charges that Bill would not be objective since that charge had been made repeatedly since his appointment both by friends and enemies of Bill’s. This item in that context seemed totally trivial, except that the issue was not about impartiality but about an alleged conflict of interest. Would the investigation of the legal office have intruded on the commission’s work? Only to the extent that Schabas would be expected, in these circumstances, to temporarily step aside. In that case, he could not influence the writing of the report in any case unless the UN lawyers responded quickly and exonerated Bill, but that is not their custom. So Bill was likely dead in the water anyway.

But his resignation comes at great cost to himself and at some cost to the credibility of the report. For Bill has not had his day “in court” as it were to prove he was not in a conflict of interest, hence leaving a bloody spot that, however much he will hereafter cry, “Out, out damn spot,” will colour his future career. But in the past, he has suffered far worse. And the resignation, except in so far as it improves the perception of impartiality of the report, is bound also to stain how it is received. An independent investigator to assess quickly whether Bill was in a conflict of interest would have better served Bill as well as protected the report in a better fashion.

However, that would entail a risk for the independent counsel might have concluded that Bill was indeed in a conflict of interest and that would have burdened the report with a much larger stain. So given what has happened since, given that Bill was between a rock and a hard place so that whatever choice he made, the outcome was not good, I believe he chose the less risky one precisely for the reasons he said, even if those reasons are unlikely to offer the protection he would like. But the succession might to some degree.

Bill Schabas’ Resignation

Bill Schabas’ Resignation

by

Howard Adelman

The rest of the documentation of Boko Haram’s atrocities in Nigeria will have to wait. William Schabas resigned three days ago as chair of the UN Inquiry Committee into the actions of both Israel and Hamas in Operation Protective Edge that took place in 2014. I have been mentally pre-occupied with the issue ever since, even though I was determined to complete this mini-series of blogs on Boko Haram in Nigeria. Why the urgency?

There is none. I will complete the Boko Haram documentation. An analysis of America’s involvement in Libya and the quadrangle of Jerusalem, Tehran, Buenos Aires and Washington have been waiting in line. But the line suddenly became longer. Further, in resigning, Schabas and the UN inquiry jumped to the front of the queue. Objectively, I could have waited. The investigative portion of the committee’s work had just been completed. It was beginning its writing phase. The report is due for completion next month. Nothing hangs on a quick write-up. Why now?

The reasons are internal, not external. Bill Schabas is a friend. I have been very critical of his appointment and his acceptance of that appointment. I am pleased he resigned and told him so. I know of his anti-Israel bias which I documented in an earlier blog (https://howardadelman.com/2014/08/12/bill-schabas/ ‎). I have been convinced that the bias could not help being infused in the report. It was not a simple bias. After all, in the past he has called for Netanyahu’s indictment as a war criminal and compared President Bashir actions in Darfur to those of Shimon Peres in dealing with the Palestinians. He disagreed that his past statements and positions should make him ineligible to take the position or that they would impair his impartiality. I could not disagree more. Now, I will never know whether I am correct. But that is not the reason for my current obsession with his resignation. I am simply puzzled by the timing, why Bill seems so easily to have fallen off the wall like Humpty Dumpty and the implications for the commission’s report.

I wrote Bill to ask if he wanted to share with me any information or elaborate further on why he resigned. He wrote back and said that he chose not to. So this blog is based on information accessible to everyone.

Before I analyze Bill’s resignation this week, let me summarize what I wrote in my previous blog after Ambassador Baudelaire Ndong Ella of Gabon, on behalf of the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), on 11 August 2014 announced that William A. Schabas had been named chair of a new panel of international experts charged with investigating “all violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, particularly in the occupied Gaza Strip, in the context of the military operations conducted since 13 June 2014.”

First, I was critical of the terms of reference of the commission which included East Jerusalem and the West Bank as well as Gaza, defined Gaza as an occupied territory, insisted the commission investigation begin on 13 June 2014 when Operation Protective Shield was launched and not when Hamas started raining rockets down on Israel, specifically excluded mentioning Hamas actions as part of the explicit terms of reference. The commission was instructed to, “establish the facts and circumstances of such violations and of the crimes perpetrated and to identify those responsible, to make recommendations, in particular on accountability measures, all with a view to avoiding and ending impunity and ensuring that those responsible are held accountable, and on ways and means to protect civilians against any further assaults.”

Bill Schabas, I explained, accepted his appointment in spite of the self-evident bias of the UNHRC because Bill himself was biased as was a fellow panelist, Doudou Diene, a former UN prosecutor and “Special Rapporteur on Contemporary forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and related intolerance”, a scholar from Senegal. He had spoken at an anti-racism rally on 14 May 2009 and declared that, “racism is rooted in slavery and colonialism, including settler colonialism.” Israel’s occupation of Palestine continues a tradition of settler colonialism and racism, he insisted.

Israel refused to cooperate with the commission because of the partiality of Doudou Diene and Bill Schabas. I have had one impassioned argument in the past with Bill over a colleague, Christine Chinkin, Professor of International Law at the London School of Economics and Political Science, who accepted a position on the Goldstone Commission, more formally, the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, even though, just prior to her appointment, she had written and pronounced judgment on Israel as criminal, the very same actions she was now asked to consider impartially as a member of an international inquiry. I argued that Christine should have recused herself and, if she did not, Richard Goldstone should have submitted his resignation. I argued, as did many others, that the reasons the commission was set up, the formulation of its mandate, the individuals appointed to it, the timeline boundaries, as well as many other factors indicated a strong perception of bias. The perception of bias was there for all to see when Richard Goldstone withdrew his own support, after the report was issued, from the claim that Israel intentionally targeted civilians (1 April 2011), but the three other members strongly criticized their own colleague, Richard Goldstone, for his retraction.

Bill insisted his colleagues were capable of acting as impartial judges in spite of their very strong assertions of guilt prior to their appointment. When he was appointed chair of the latest inquiry into Gaza, he repeatedly insisted he was capable of the same impartiality and lack of bias in spite of his previous strong written and oral condemnations of Israeli actions. He strongly defended to me and others his right to assume the position and insisted that he would ensure that the committee of inquiry proceeded in an impartial manner. At the same time, Bill has previously argued that impartiality is a misleading and even destructive criterion in drawing up commissions of inquiry or tribunals or selecting their agendas. For Bill, all international law is inherently political. Hence, in spite of his repeated pronouncements many times on Israel’s international criminality, he saw no need to recuse himself because “he is a scholar with integrity.”

Bill has in the past not only called for both Netanyahu and Peres to be prosecuted for crimes against humanity as I indicated above, but has also defended the Durban conference on racism. He has been accused of characterizing President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran as only a “provocative politician,” and paying no attention to his role as a persecutor of Baha’is and his being a notorious anti-Semite. These charges, which I myself previously repeated, are incorrect. Bill did serve as one of six commissioners on the Iran Tribunal Truth Commission from 18-22 June 2012. (http://www.irantribunal.com/index.php/en/sessions/truth-commission/306-findings-truth-commission) That commission reported on the heinous abuses in the arrests, brutal tortures and mass executions carried out by the regime between 1981 and 1988 and the impact of these brutalities on the families of the victims and the survivors of the torture and imprisonment.  The Truth Commission concluded:

“These violations of human rights were devised, instigated and executed (or caused to be executed) by a single central authority and as such the Islamic Republic of Iran is the only authority responsible for these acts.”

Bill has not been an apologist for Ahmadinejad but, in his most recent trip to Iran, accompanied Sandra Schulberg, producer of Nuremberg, Its Lesson for Today screening of the film for young Iranians. In the lion’s den, he spoke about the horrors of the Holocaust and the importance of the values of the Nuremberg trial in combating historic anti-Semitism. Though Bill is unquestionably very critical of Israel, he is neither an apologist nor one who even ignores anti-Semites.

That said, I have three major questions, at this specific point in time, why did Israel choose to present the United Nations Human Rights Commission with the key evidence that led to Bill’s resignation? Second, why was it sufficient to force Bill Schabas’ resignation? Third, what is the significance of the resignation since Bill insists that the report will not be affected by his resignation, and will be published as expected at the beginning of next month. Foreign Minister Lieberman of Israel agreed. For Lieberman contended that Bill’s resignation is not expected to change the contents of the report, but nevertheless celebrated Bill’s resignation as “a diplomatic achievement for Israel and the activities of its foreign ministry.”

Let me begin with what I find most puzzling – Israel’s decision to present evidence to a United Nations Human Rights Council with which it is not cooperating and which is purportedly not expected to change the content of the report. So why now? Why not wait until the report is issued and use the information collected to undermine the report when it is issued? Why choose this time if Israel’s actions are not expected to undermine the results? And why celebrate the resignation as a diplomatic victory? What was the evidence Israel presented three days ago to the UNHRC that set in motion Bill’s sudden resignation?

Israel had lodged a complaint before the UNHRC accusing Bill of “clear and documented bias against Israel,” specifically citing a “contractual relationship with the Palestinian side” prior to becoming head of the commission. Israel put before the UNHRC evidence that Bill had received $1,300 for a legal opinion he wrote for the Palestine Liberation Organization in 2012, an action which Bill acknowledged in the press conference at his resignation, but insisted that the opinion he wrote was of a “technical legal nature” drawn from scholarly work he had published and that he had not been hired or paid as an advocate on behalf of the PLO. It was no different than advice he had given to many other governments and organizations. Further, he insisted such advice constituted only “a tiny part” of what he called “his body of academic work.” In his letter of resignation, he admitted that he had written,

“a legal opinion for the ‘Negotiations Affairs Department/Palestinian Negotiations Support Project’ of the Palestine Liberation Organisation. The legal opinion was to consider the consequences of a UN General Assembly resolution upgrading Palestine’s status to that of a non-member state on the declaration that was lodged by Palestine with the International Criminal Court in January 2009. It also addressed whether accession should include acceptance of the amendments to the Statute adopted at Kampala and how the territorial jurisdiction of the Court might be applied. These are matters on which, as one of the academic specialists on the subject of the Rome Statute, I have frequently expressed myself in lectures and in publications. A 7-page opinion was provided on 28 October 2012 and I received remuneration of $1,300, as previously agreed. I have done no other consultation and provided no other opinions for the State of Palestine, the Palestinian Liberation Organisation or any other related body.”

So why did he accept the commission and why did he charge $1,300 if the advice was freely available by reading Bill’s writings? Why had Bill not disclosed this possible conflict of interest earlier to the UNHRC? Bill explained that he had not been asked to detail his consultancy work when he was appointed (curious indeed!), that, his views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict had been well known and that he had pledged to serve “with independence and impartiality.” As he continued,

The complaint about my brief consultancy, as I understand it, is not about the content, which is of a technical legal nature, but the implication that in some way I am henceforth beholden to the Palestine Liberation Organisation. Perhaps there is also the suggestion that I might tailor my opinions in one direction in order to generate more such consulting for remuneration. If I were indeed motivated by financial gain, it would be hard to explain why I would have accepted the position as Chair of the Commission of Inquiry, to which I have gladly devoted several months of work and for which there is no remuneration whatsoever.

But in the complaint registered, there is no suggestion that he has been motivated by financial gain or that rendering the opinion would influence his future judgments about Gaza and Israel’s role. That is a red herring. This issue is one of an apparent conflict of interest. And that is quite separate from his past partial opinions on Israel and the question of whether he could be impartial in his current role. For impartiality is an ethical issue. An alleged conflict of interest is a legal issue. In law, accepting such a fee, on the surface, should disqualify one from accepting a role as a judge. And one cannot offer the excuse that the fee was for an opinion to the PLO, not Hamas, for the mandate of the commission included investigating Israel’s actions in both East Jerusalem and the West Bank.

“A conflict of interest occurs where a personal interest is sufficiently connected with public or professional duties that it results in a reasonable apprehension that the personal interest may influence the exercise of professional or public responsibilities.” It is not just, though it can be, an issue of benefitting financially. A conflict of interest arises if a person in a position of judgment about one entity (Israel) has worked on behalf of another entity (the PLO) which has adverse interests to that of Israel. Further, the rules of law demand vigilance with respect to possible conflicts of interest.

Note first that a conflict of interest is not the same as partiality. A person charged with the responsibility of making a judgment may, by his prior behaviour, actions and writing, have demonstrated pre-judgments which could affect his or her opinion, but total impartiality is not part of a job description. The absence of a conflict of interest is. An individual is normally disqualified if the interest is so related to the exercise of public duty that a reasonably well-informed person would conclude that the interest might influence the exercise of that duty. Not that it would, but that it might. The appearance of a conflict is sufficient for disqualification.

But was this a case of a conflict of interest? For Bill was not advocating on behalf of the PLO nor representing the PLO. He was serving as a technical expert on the law. But is this nevertheless not a procedural violation? Administrative law differentiates between legal work as an advocate or authorized representative and legal work as a technical specialist and consultant. Bill did not intervene in the ICC on behalf of the PLO. In Bill’s letter he is clearly suggesting that in law that he was not in a conflict of interest. I think he may be correct. So why did Israel use this material, and use it at this time, to undermine his role? Why did he resign? And what are the implications?

Aside from the issue of how Israel obtained such information, did Israel proffering this information expect and anticipate that it would lead to Bill’s resignation? I believe it was a tipping point. But Bill is both stubborn and arrogant and believes he has the divine capacity to bracket and rise above his past and render totally impartial judgments. I am not the only one critical of his belief. Persons of much more eminence than I have told Bill the same thing. Aryeh Neier, founding director of Human Rights Watch, former head of the ACLU, President Emeritus of George Soros’ Open Society Foundation, and a lecturer with Bill Schabas at the Paris School of International Affairs, concurs. So does Joseph Weiler, President of the European University Institute in Florence and Editor-in-Chief of the European Journal of International Law.

This issue is a tipping point, not because it provides a definitive legal case against him, but because in the current situation at the stage at which the commission is at, the process of dealing with the legal charge is so disruptive that the very legal process of adjudicating the issue would be an enormous distraction from the commission’s work. The information has set in process an unstoppable force which the ethical demands of impartiality had not. The information has resulted in a new and irreversible development which would make it impossible for Bill to continue no matter what the opinion might be of the legal department of the UN. The information was rovided by Israel on Friday in the full knowledge that it would serve to either tip the balance to force a resignation or, at the very least, undermine his moral authority as chair

Israel wanted Bill out now and believed it now had the case that would drive him out, and, as a fallback position, would undermine the work of the commission even further. Tomorrow I will deal with why Israel chose this time to push Bill over the cliff and why Bill agreed to jump rather than be pushed. I will also deal with the implications of his downfall on the contents of the report and its likely reception.

Tomorrow: Was He Pushed or Did He Jump? Why?

Part IX: Application of Just War Norms to the Gaza War

Part IX: Application of Just War Norms to the Gaza War

by

Howard Adelman

On 23 July, the Human Rights Council of the United Nations set up the Schabas Commission (A/HRC/RES S-21/1 which can be found at A-HRC-S-212-I_en-1(1).doc) The resolution was not set up just to look into the possibility of war crimes committed in the conduct of the 2014 Fifty Day Gaza War between Hamas and Israel. The war would not end for another month. The Report was entitled, “Ensuring respect for international law in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem”.

Though Bill Schabas insisted to me that the preamble was just UN boilerplate, the mandate clearly biases the inquiry in at least four ways:
a) presuming that Gaza is occupied by Israel – the preamble explicitly emphasized “the obligations of Israel as the occupying Power to ensure the welfare and safety of the Palestinian civilian population under its occupation in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and in the Gaza Strip (my italics), and noting Israel’s wilful abdication and rejection of its obligations in this regard;
b) inclusion of the West Bank and East Jerusalem where no war took place;
c) exclusion of Israel where thousands of rockets fired from Gaza landed;
d) a clear lack of balance between the overwhelming focus on Israeli actions and the few sideline references to actions of Hamas in Gaza without once mentioning Hamas.

But clashes did take place over the war in both the West Bank and East Jerusalem. On Thursday evening, 24 July, just after the Inquiry Commission was set up, protests took place in East Jerusalem. 20 protesters were arrested for throwing rocks. The Border Police prevented men over 50 years of age from attending the al-Aqsa Mosque just as Ramadan was ending.

In addition, there were a number of protests in the West Bank where Palestinian civilians were killed. On Saturday 26 July, one of the last days of Ramadan, Eid Fdilat from the al-Aroub camp near Hebron and 14-year-old Nasri Mahmoud in Beit Faijar near Bethlehem, who were killed in clashes the day before, were buried. In Beit Omar, two men aged 27 and 47 were killed in protests. In Hawara south of Nablus, two young men aged 21 and 22 were killed. In total, 10 Palestinians were killed and 200 wounded in those Friday protests following prayers in which protesters threw both rocks and Molotov cocktails at police and, according to Israel, even used live ammunition. Fearing a third intifada and determined to suppress it at once, Israeli Border Police fired stun grenades, and both rubber and live bullets at the protesters.

The main catalyst for the protests was the killing by an Israeli missile on Thursday 24 July of at least 10 civilians who had taken shelter along with 3,000 other Gazans in an UNRWA facility as described in an earlier blog, though, as I said there, the depiction has been challenged as a staged event following a misfired Hamas rocket but with only prima facie evidence and insufficient proof.

This time it was not only mullahs giving sermons in mosques that had stirred up the protests in a “day of anger” against the almost 1,000 Gazans (BBC reported 800) killed in the Gaza War in just over two weeks. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, who heretofore had been silent and acquiescent concerning Israel’s reprisals, first against Hamas in the West Bank and then against Gaza, now called for demonstrations, demonstrations which were organized mainly by Hamas supporters if the number of Hamas flags held up in the protests offered any indication.

However, the commission covering the West Bank and East Jerusalem as well as Gaza was set up before the clashes and deaths of Palestinians in the West Bank. Further, these killings were not part of just war international law but only human rights law. The effect, at the very least, explicitly conjoined human rights and international just war law into a single inquiry. The preamble to the inquiry affirmed “the applicability of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, in particular the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem.”

However, one clause in the preamble could have referred to Hamas behaviour in Gaza – the reference to the fact that “the deliberate targeting of civilians and other protected persons and the perpetration of systematic, flagrant and widespread violations of applicable international humanitarian law and international human rights law in situations of armed conflict constitute grave breaches and a threat to international peace and security.” However, the clause immediately following referred only to Israel; Hamas is never explicitly mentioned.

Deploring the massive Israeli military operations in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, since 13 June 2014, which have involved disproportionate and indiscriminate attacks and resulted in grave violations of the human rights of the Palestinian civilian population, including through the most recent Israeli military assault on the occupied Gaza Strip, the latest in a series of military aggressions by Israel, and actions of mass closure, mass arrest and the killing of civilians in the occupied West Bank.

It would appear that the Human Rights Council had already prejudged the outcome of an inquiry by pronouncing in advance that Israeli actions in the Gaza War were disproportionate in its use of firepower and did not properly discriminate between militants and civilians. If the preamble indicated bias, the singular focus on Israel in the mandate clauses pulled no punches. The Human Rights Council in its 23rd of July resolution in its second clause,

2. Condemns in the strongest terms the widespread, systematic and gross violations of international human rights and fundamental freedoms arising from the Israeli military operations carried out in the Occupied Palestinian Territory since 13 June 2014, particularly the latest Israeli military assault on the occupied Gaza Strip, by air, land and sea, which has involved disproportionate and indiscriminate attacks, including aerial bombardment of civilian areas, the targeting of civilians and civilian properties in collective punishment contrary to international law, and other actions, including the targeting of medical and humanitarian personnel, that may amount to international crimes, directly resulting in the killing of more than 650 Palestinians, most of them civilians and more than 170 of whom are children, the injury of more than 4,000 people and the wanton destruction of homes, vital infrastructure and public properties;
The prejudgement in advance of the inquiry and in setting up the inquiry is as explicit as one could make it. It is as if a trial of an alleged criminal began with the explicit condemnation of guilt not just by the prosecutor but by the court. The UNHRC assumes its role to be one of prosecutor, judge and jury rolled into one entitled to draw conclusions of guilt before a truly independent investigation had been held and certainly before any trial.

The mandate may appear to be balanced when the next clause condemned “all violence against civilians wherever it occurs, including the killing of two Israeli civilians as a result of rocket fire.” But the mandate no sooner makes this brief and indirect reference to Hamas rocket fire than it implicitly restricts the inquiry to the very few situations in which civilians in Israel were killed. The mandate takes away even an appearance of balance by immediately subsuming Hamas’ actions within the same clause by referring to the obligations of “all parties” concerned to respect their obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law.

Another clause of the preamble reaffirmed the findings of the Goldstone Commission and placed this new inquiry clearly as a continuation of that previous one, especially in the context of the Commission making statements on the Gaza War that Israel was deliberately targeting civilians, in spite of Goldstone’s own retraction of that finding..
Gravely concerned at the lack of implementation of the recommendations contained in the report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict of 2009, and convinced that lack of accountability for violations of international law reinforces a culture of impunity, leading to a recurrence of violations and seriously endangering the maintenance of international peace,
The preamble even made reference to Israel’s construction of the security barrier and the Council’s conclusion that this was a violation of human rights. For the Human Rights Council, “systemic impunity for international law violations has created a justice crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory that warrants action, including accountability for international crimes.”

The mandate does not call for a cessation of rocket fire from Gaza but does call for “an immediate cessation of Israeli military assaults throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and an end to attacks against all civilians, including Israeli civilians.” Clause 6 of the mandate explicitly “Demands that Israel, the occupying Power (my italics), immediately and fully end its illegal closure of the occupied Gaza Strip, which in itself amounts to collective punishment of the Palestinian civilian population, including through the immediate, sustained and unconditional opening of the crossings for the flow of humanitarian aid, commercial goods and persons to and from the Gaza Strip, in compliance with its obligations under international humanitarian law.” Of course, this was precisely the objective of Hamas in initiating the war. One would never have a clue that humanitarian aid continued to flow across the crossing points into Gaza throughout the war or that Egypt had closed the crossing into Rafah completely.

There is no reference to the three Israeli Yeshiva teenagers abducted and murdered, but the mandate does explicitly refer to the murder of one Palestinian boy by extremist Jewish thugs, for the mandate “Expresses grave concern at the rising number of incidents of violence, destruction, harassment, provocation and incitement by extremist Israeli settlers illegally transferred to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, against Palestinian civilians, including children, and their properties, and condemns in the strongest terms the resulting perpetration of hate crimes.”

If the mandate was really serious about investigating the use of civilians, it would not only call on Israel to protect civilians as much as possible, but would call on Hamas, the governing authority in Gaza, to ensure civilian protection. The mandate explicitly ignores this fact and makes no reference to the possible use by Hamas of “human shields”.

So when the Human Rights Council

Decides to urgently dispatch an independent, international commission of inquiry, to be appointed by the President of the Human Rights Council, to investigate all violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, particularly in the occupied Gaza Strip, in the context of the military operations conducted since 13 June 2014, whether before, during or after, to establish the facts and circumstances of such violations and of the crimes perpetrated and to identify those responsible, to make recommendations, in particular on accountability measures, all with a view to avoiding and ending impunity and ensuring that those responsible are held accountable, and on ways and means to protect civilians against any further assaults, and to report to the Council at its twenty-eighth session;
one can only sigh and despair at the total surrender of principles of neutrality and impartiality. One can only raise one’s eyebrows in wonder at the use of the word “independent” when the commission of inquiry is to operate under the auspices of the Human Rights Council and to be conducted by individuals appointed by the President of the Council.

When the only party to vote against this overtly totally biased and disreputable resolution was the United States, and when pusillanimous states, such as Austria, Britain, Germany, the Czech Republic, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan and Korea, only abstained along with a few other small countries, it is little wonder that Israel has virtually no trust in the procedures of the UN. When the countries supporting the resolution and ensuring its majority include Algeria, Cuba, Ethiopia, Kuwait, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, the United Arab Emirates and Vietnam, one has to ask how and why Bill Schabas would accept such an appointment. The mandate and the process exceed any decent norms of fairness. Why Latin American countries — such as Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Costa Rica — also supported such a resolution has to be of concern to Israel and those who believe in a UN run as much as possible, especially in the area of human rights, on as impartial a basis as possible.

The appointment of Bill Schabas to head the commission also has to be regarded as a serious disappointment, He is certainly an excellent scholar and expert on international law, but when it comes to Israel, he had already pronounced on the illegality of Israeli actions in Gaza. He should have recused himself as a scholar given our commitment, however imperfectly, to the academic values of impartiality, objectivity, detachment, disinterestedness and open-mindedness, especially when charged with an inquiry into such a contentious area. Now it is clear that there can be no objectivity in an absolute sense since objectivity is itself a value commitment and is to be understood against a background that defines and enjoins neutrality in approaching contentious issues. This approach requires judgement, so there is no absolute neutrality and impartiality. There is, however, a big difference between the effort to maximize neutrality and impartiality both in appearance and substance and the virtual absence of these criteria. There is very little sense of neutrality and judgement in the terms of reference of the Commission or in its appointees.

Neutrality and impartiality are the key ingredients with respect to any adjudication, particularly when there is a conflict between two parties. These two qualities are especially important if the “neutral” party is to influence the actions and behaviour of the belligerents. However, the Commission seems obsessed with scoring points against Israel, countering “impunity” and holding Israel “responsible” rather than enhancing the rule of international law to truly protect civilians, especially in times and places of war.

What could have been done? A three person commission made up of a very respected Israeli academic on international law, an equally highly respected Palestinian academic or jurist with expertise on international law, and a third appointment drawn from the international community with an equally stellar reputation and agreed to by both the Israeli and the Palestinian appointee could have been charged with looking into specific alleged charges of possible breaches of international just war laws. Any of the three would have to recuse him or herself if they had made any public pronouncements on the illegality or immorality of the case. This may be akin to finding precious gems or locating a fair jury in a highly publicized murder trial where the depiction of the alleged murdered was widely distributed, but it is difficult not impossible. And it is the first principle of ensuring justice. But “justice’ seems to be a word unfamiliar to the Human Rights Council.

The human rights of Palestinians in the territories should not have been merged with a just war inquiry if only because there is already a debate among international law experts on whether just war theory is merely a sub-category of universal human rights or whether it has to be understood in conjunction with the reality of war which in its very essence is not an activity primarily concerned with human rights, though, in my view, and that of many others, going to war and conduct in war should be bounded by certain limitations governed by just law principles, but these are neither subordinate to nor subsumed under human rights principles.

This alludes to a much larger issue – the effort of cosmopolitan international philosophers and legal theorists to subsume all international ethical and legal issues under a human rights rubric versus those who consider that human rights law is not a monotheistic secular religion but exists and lives among various overlapping constellations of ethical principles — such as those governing the conduct of war or those regarding the treatment of refugees. The irony is that it seems to be the cosmopolitan theorists who are most likely to allow bias and partiality to infect their analyses whereas ethicists or lawyers, for example, conjoined to the military in th United States, for example, seem far more capable of a detached approach when examining specific cases in which accusations have been made about abuses of the norms of just war.

Tomorrow: Part X Reconciling War Strategy and International Law