Return Trip

Return Trip


Howard Adelman

Yesterday morning we started our trip back to Toronto. We left Victoria, B.C. earlier than expected because the house we had rented turned out to be a bust even though it had a wonderful location and terrific views. This was our first error in renting houses out of perhaps fifty over the years. The change, however, meant that we could travel back to Toronto in a more leisurely way. As if it was symbolic, our last restaurant meal proved to be equally disastrous. This was my review of Vic’s Steakhouse in Victoria BC.

This was the worst steakhouse at which my wife and I have eaten. My wife’s crab cakes were inedible (they were returned to the kitchen) and the lettuce in her salad was gritty and presumably had not been washed properly. My medium rare steak was properly cooked but was mediocre, but the seared potatoes were lukewarm rather than hot. The broccoli was mushy. The service by Victor was very friendly and accommodating, but when my wife asked for bread and was served six slices of doughy white bread with a pot of butter, we were insulted that they wanted to charge extra for the order. [I am not eating bread during Passover.] Either this was an off night for the restaurant with a substitute cook or the restaurant should close. After questioning our bill, the charges for the crab cakes and the bread were graciously removed and explained as an error.

This bad experience was not typical of Victoria. For example, the Aura Restaurant was superb. But it did spoil our last evening. Yesterday morning we planned to take the 11:00 a.m. ferry to the mainland but were lucky and got on the 10:00 a.m. one which had been put on as an extra for Easter Monday. The ferry trip from Victoria to Vancouver, if you have never taken it, should not be missed. The hour and a half trip through the islands between Victoria and Vancouver is simply great.

However, the road trip until east of Abbotsford could easily be skipped if possible, but we were soon into the beautiful mountains en route to Hope, B.C. We did not stop there but pressed on and were quite shocked as the mountains became almost barren. At first I thought the mountainside had been just massively cleared of trees, but it soon became obvious that trees had never been in abundance. Only last evening did I read that we had passed through a desert area of the mountains that received relatively little rain. As we approached Osoyoos, the fruit farms were in full blossom and we passed many vineyards, but they grew and were prolific, much as in California, because of irrigation. Unfortunately, all the fruit stands seemed closed, understandable for this time of year.

We did pass six places where a kind of Muskoka chair with a higher back was raised up carrying a sign advertising Osoyoos cabins. At first, I made the mistake of thinking the sign was for a place that built something called “Osoyoos cabins”.  The signs provided a humorous interlude, and we needed some type of relief.

We had been told that the trip through southern B.C. was exquisitely beautiful compared to traveling through Washington State. Until we reached Osoyoos, we were deeply disappointed. The towns of Princeton, Hedley and Cawston seemed little more than shack towns littered with RV camps and the odd old car dump. Had we made another mistake? Had our luck in traveling run out beginning with that terrible meal in the steakhouse in Victoria? Were we being punished for leaving our grandchild for months before we would see him again? Perhaps the accommodation I had booked in Osoyoos would also be terrible.

As it turned out, the Watermark Beach Resort was a lovely place. Because we were traveling in the shoulder season between winter and summer recreation, we had a suite and not just a room and at a very good price. But what was most surprising was the small tapas bar in the hotel that did not even have its own name. We were served by a high spirited ex-Liverpudlian who had been raised in Dublin. Though he was the only one serving – there were not that many tables occupied – the service was superb. But the meal was even greater. I was surprised subsequently to learn that not all the reviews were raves, but ours certainly was. The beef vegetable soup I had was hot, tasty and very hearty with excellent meat and firm rather than mushy vegetables, The carpaccio with the extra garnishes was terrific. My chicken curry was not too spicy, but very tasty with excellent locally-made yogurt and a cherry condiment.

Our stay has been great. This morning we will visit three local wineries and then drive to Bonners Ferry in northern Idaho taking the slightly longer but reputedly exceptionally beautiful route on highway 3A rather than 3 from Castlegar around Lake Kootenay and through the Kootenay Pass. I have even identified a small café – Dawn’s Early Rising Sunshine Café and Bistro – in Castlegar for our one stop en route – other than for taking pictures. I hope it is a success.


Responses to the Iran Deal

Responses to the Iran Deal


Howard Adelman

Rabbi Dow Marmur’s last blog ended by quoting my blog and writing that my analysis helped enhance his enjoyment of Passover. I was both flattered and delighted, of course. But the blog itself was far more interesting and I noticed a pattern between it and many of the other post-deal commentators who supported the nuclear framework agreement with Iran. Dow wrote that he came to his support by examining the alternatives. He focused on war against Iran as the alternative. Other commentators concentrated on containment and increased sanctions as the real alternative that Netanyahu really favours. There is, of course, a third alternative, continuing the pressure of the existing sanctions at the current level, perhaps Netanyahu’s fallback position.

However, it is not only the comparison of the deal with other possible alternatives that caught my interest, but the analysis of the pros and cons relative to the alternatives. The critics of the deal did not proceed in that way. Instead, they began with the undisputed conclusions of most observers of Iran that the government there sponsors terrorist organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah, persecutes minorities, particularly the Baha’is, denies rights, has ambitions to become a dominant regional power and has, as an ultimate objective, the extermination of Israel. The factual premises of both groups are the same. What divides the doves and the hawks is whether the nuclear deal helps or hinders the West in its conflicts with Iran.

Thus, the leader of the US House of Representatives, Republican Speaker John Boehner, in a written statement, focused on his fears, after visiting the Middle East, about Iran’s efforts to spread terrorism. Easing economic sanctions will permit Iran “to further destabilize the region.” But there was a note of hope. For he did not blast the agreement as Netanyahu did, but insisted that Congress be able “to review details of any pact before sanctions are lifted.” Aside from the House of Representatives not having any constitutional rights to approve or vote down agreements with other states, his statement could suggest that the Republicans have shifted their attack mode from the substance of the agreement to procedural processes. I would contend, however, that the essential question is not whether the deal enhances or interferes with a larger political and security agenda, but whether it successfully enhances the objective of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. If it may also advance a larger political agenda, that would be a bonus.

For the hawks, the issue is not really how good or bad the deal is, though they spend enormous efforts seeking out flaws, but that any imaginable deal, even one that ended up totally destroying every single bit of Iran’s nuclear capability, would not be good enough for most of those critics. Why? Because the confrontation on the nuclear issue unites West and East in opposition to Iran. Removing that incentive, the anti-Iran coalition weakens considerably, hence undermining the opposition to Iran’s foreign policy ambitions and its support of terrorism, quite aside from Iran’s ambitions against Israel. An effective nuclear deal allows Iran increased economic capacities to support terrorists and develop its non-nuclear technological military capabilities.

However, there are also those who criticize the deal whose position I cannot understand at all. They include Benjamin Netanyahu. Although he did not repeat his silly notion that Iran had to recognize Israel’s right to exist as a condition for an agreement on the use of nuclear energy, the latest iteration of his position is that the agreement with Iran will spark a nuclear arms race among Sunni countries in the Middle East. His message then struck a familiar note common to many post-deal critics. His position is the precise opposite of my own. Instead of characterizing Iran as capitulating on a number of items, he dubbed it “a dream deal for Iran and a nightmare deal for the world.” Why? Because it “leaves the preeminent terrorist state of our time with a vast nuclear infrastructure.”

The contention that it will spark a Middle East arms race may have been set off by the reported Saudi and other Gulf Sunni Arab states that the agreement is dangerous because it effectively gives Iran the resources and carte blanche to pursue its expansionist agenda against Sunni Arab states in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and, most recently, in Yemen. Further, Hani ala-Jamal, as one example, in al-Wafd, a newspaper published by the Wafd party in Giza, Egypt, argues that, “The deal means that the international community has accepted Iran as a nuclear power.”

It would be helpful to the debate if the conflict over the political and strategic significance of the deal was not littered with so much shrapnel. For example, Netanyahu has insisted that “not one centrifuge is destroyed” in the framework agreement. But of 19,000 centrifuges in Iran’s possession, 13,000 are decommissioned. The ones retained are all the old slower models. The de-commissioning and mothballing is subject to stringent inspection and transparency requirements. Effectively, this means significant delays before Iran could make them operational with plenty of time for the UN and Western countries to respond, especially since the removal of the sanctions has a snap-back provision. But when one reads critics like Netanyahu, all one gets is rhetoric, not considered argument, and rhetoric that distorts to the point of obfuscation and incredulity.

What is interesting is that some of the stalwarts of opposition to the agreement in the American Congress have been much more cautious in responding to the framework agreement. Senator Bob Corker (R-Tenn.), the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, commented that, “I don’t know how someone can ascertain whether this is something good or bad,” until he had more details about the framework agreement, an implicit criticism of Netanyahu. This is the same Corker who just two weeks previously had been insisting that Congress, especially the Senate, have not only a say in the deal, but would have to approve the agreement in accordance with the proposed Bipartisan Iran Nuclear Review Act of 2015 if it is passed on 14 April. That bill had been proceeding through the Senate, but there are even more doubts now that it would be approved given both Democratic hawks who would question opposing such a strong agreement as well as some wavering Republicans. Further, some Republican supporters of strong presidential power would be reluctant to support such a measure lest a bad precedent be set. Even if approved, it would certainly be vetoed by Obama.

Obama has plenty of precedent to insist that this agreement is not a treaty requiring two-thirds assent in the Senate, but an executive agreement made between and among heads of government and internationally binding on the states which enter into the agreement. Unless Corker could muster a two-thirds veto-proof majority for his own bill requiring Obama to obtain Congressional approval, which seems far less likely that just a few weeks ago given the toughness of the agreement, Obama seems to have a clear path to conclude his greatest foreign policy achievement. Obama could just issue executive orders through the Treasury Department to lift the sanctions. As John Bolton, the former Bush State Department official, U.N. ambassador, champion of the Iraq war and stalwart opponent of an agreement with Iran, has said in all honesty, 90% of post WWII foreign agreements have been made without Congressional input let alone approval.

Corker is simply not able to muster 13 Democratic Senators and 46 House Democrats to place such binding restrictions on a presidential initiative simply on the basis that Iran has been able to retain some operational centrifuges and can enrich some uranium to a limited degree. Some hawks, including independents like Sen Angus King of Maine, might still support Corker’s bill, but even King is opposed to making Iran a partisan issue. After all, this was the premise of the Joint Plan of Action that set off the negotiations and Congress did not exert any effort to reign in that effort. Ben Cardin (D-MD), another hawk, also supports a strong president. Senator Chuck Schumer (D-NY), another strong anti-Iran hawk, remains a conundrum. He has strong Jewish backing, but given the terms of the agreement, would he vote to reduce presidential authority significantly because of this issue? In any case, there are enough members of Congress who previously supported Corker’s bill to back off and ensure that a two-thirds majority could not be mustered to flout the president.

There is another aspect to the considerations. Any effort to scuttle the agreement would set off a severe schism between the U.S. and its allies that are part of the P5+1. They would feel betrayed and a deep rift would emerge between the U.S. and Europe, much deeper than the one between the U.S. president and Netanyahu. Perhaps the hawks would be better off to see if the framework agreement could be translated into an actual detailed agreement. That is another hurdle, and not a small one. But given the prospect of Congress failing to impede the president on a deal that on the non-proliferation issue seems very strong even if ineffective when it comes to Iran’s non-nuclear political, military and strategic goals, I would claim that if the framework can actually be translated into a full agreement, a prospect that seems very likely at this moment, the President can expect relatively smooth sailing in spite of the head winds coming from his Congressional enemies.

For the reality of the deal is that it contains provisions that detached observers previously thought might be impossible to achieve – exceeding the ambition of 6,000 operational centrifuges, eliminating any advanced design centrifuges, reconfiguring the heavy-water reactor Arak and ensuring that any plutonium produced is stored offshore, reducing the amount of enriched uranium by 97% to only 300 kg. for fifteen years, keeping that uranium at a level of 3.67 instead of 5% enrichment, and redesigning Fordow so that it cannot even enrich uranium. However, the key victory is a stringent inspection and transparency regime. It is no surprise then that the Committee of Independent Scientists who have never taken a partisan stand on the Iran issue has cautiously approved the framework agreement.

The Obama administration did not intend to bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities and such an initiative independently by Israel was strongly opposed by its own intelligence and security apparatus. Now that America’s European allies have signed onto the framework agreement the prospect of retaining the sanctions at the present level never mind increasing them seems unlikely. The real alternative if America does not sign the final agreement is that a much weaker sanctions regime would be the result. To take up the issue raised at the beginning of this blog, it is no wonder that the hawks do not consider alternatives but simply blare out their opposition to the deal. The hawks have been deeply wounded by the actual results.

Why did Netanyahu not seek further side agreements and letters with its European and American allies to doubly ensure that the provisions of the agreement could not become ineffective and to ensure Israel’s security? As Maj. Gen. (Res.) Amos Yadlin, former head of the Israeli Military Intelligence, said, “If we had a prime minister who knows how to talk to the Americans and enjoyed the president’s trust, this would have been the time to jump on the bandwagon and demand clarification of all the points that require clarification. There are still things that can be achieved in this agreement. At the same time, this is the time to reach understandings with the Americans, and perhaps even to reach a parallel Israeli-US agreement, providing Israel with clarifications, assurances and perhaps even defense compensation for the risks it is taking. We did things like that after the peace agreement with Egypt and at different points in time, too.”

One explanation is that Netanyahu was playing the bad cop, but this seems highly unlikely given the actual severe negative consequences on U.S.-Israeli relations. The only realistic judgment, and one made increasingly by the mavins in Israel’s intelligence and military apparatus, is that Netanyahu in his strident and absolute opposition to the framework agreement just dug his own grave.

The reality is that the deal does not pave the way for Iran to become a nuclear military power but rather turns a superhighway that Iran had constructed and was already in place into a dirt path for all terrain vehicles. But that is not the real issue. Opponents of the deal wanted to use sanctions to weaken Iran militarily and economically so the country could not pursue its foreign policy agenda. They were not just after implementation of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Relief from the sanctions will enable Iran to pursue its foreign policy objectives with more resources and more concentrated effort. More to the point, Israel – and Saudi Arabia – have great fears that the agreement will pave the way, not for a nuclear Iran, but for further collaboration in the future between Iran and the U.S.

There is some hope among doves that increasing engagement with Iran will lead to further moderation in Iran’s foreign and domestic policy. I do not feel as sanguine on that score, but still feel a non-nuclear Iran is both better for the world and for Israel. The framework deal goes a very long way to achieving that goal, though there are never any absolute guarantees. The agreement has been part of a long sustained process begun when the U.S. discovered the underground facility at Fordow. The U.S. introduced and gradually enhanced sanctions in concert with other powers while, at the same time, the U.S. and Israel used covert espionage and cyber warfare, in particular, the Stuxnet virus, to damage the Iranian nuclear program. Other even more destructive techniques have been held in abeyance. At the same time, Obama repeatedly offered diplomacy and the other unclenched hand as an alternative.

In contrast to the George W. Bush rash militarism without thinking through the methods let alone the possible unanticipated unintended consequences of war, Obama has taken a modest and situational approach that is both cautious and incremental. Sometimes it has been too cautious. At other times, too aggressive, as in Libya. However, relatively the policy has avoided America becoming involved in wars it cannot win. Thus, the success of the Iran framework agreement has not been a one-off success but part of a broader approach of which this has been the preeminent achievement.

Iranian Capitulation

Iranian Capitulation


Howard Adelman

Neither side will call the deal “capitulation”. That would be politically incorrect and only damage the working of the deal. But how else can one characterize the terms and conditions of the parameters of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action between Iran and the P5+1? Afterwards, I have included the White House summary of the key terms of the deal, but let me first highlight some of them.

  1. The principle that there is no deal until everything is agreed is retained; there will be no lifting of sanctions until all the technical details are worked out by 30 June 2015.
  2. The number of installed centrifuges that Iran will be permitted to keep is indeed in the 6,000 to 6.500 range as expected – specifically 6,104 – but, surprisingly, all of them, rather than just two thirds will be the older style much slower IR-1s.
  3. Only 5,060 centrifuges will be allowed to be used to enrich uranium, lower than expected.
  4. The enrichment of uranium is restricted to 3.67% not 5%.
  5. The restrictions apply for 15 rather than just 10 years.
  6. The stockpile of 3.67% enriched uranium is restricted to only 300 kg, and that restriction is applied for 15 years.
  7. Excess centrifuges and production facilities will be mothballed under strict IAEA supervision but available as replacement parts.
  8. Iran will not be allowed to build any new enrichment facilities for 15 years.
  9. The breakout time of at least a year to resume greater enrichment is restricted to 10 years, but it is not clear why this is the case since all the other key provisions to make sure the breakout period is at least a year remain in place.
  10. Surprisingly, Fordow is to be decommissioned and re-purposed as a nuclear research centre and cannot be converted back into a uranium enrichment facility for 15 years; further, during those 15 years, Iran cannot undertake research on nuclear enrichment.
  11. In effect, Natanz will be the only nuclear enrichment facility restricted to using only IR-1 centrifuges for 10 years after which the more advanced centrifuges can be employed but only within strict guidelines for another five years, guidelines which ensure the breakout time remains at least at one year.
  12. Monitoring will not only include Natanz and Fordow, but the whole chain of production, including access to uranium mines and mills for 25 years and centrifuge production facilities for 20 years.
  13. Arak will be redesigned and rebuilt in accordance with P+1 specifications and will not be permitted to produce any weapons-grade plutonium; the core will be destroyed.
  14. Spent fuel, as expected, will be shipped abroad, though this seemed to be a last minute sticking point.
  15. Iran cannot reprocess or even conduct research on reprocessing spent fuel indefinitely.
  16. Iran can only retain sufficient heavy water for its own needs, will not be able to store excess heavy water and will not be able to develop new heavy water production facilities for 15 years.
  17. Most surprising to me, Iran did not win a single concession on sanctions relief. Relief will only come after verification of all the terms of the deal and new UN resolutions will be passed to cover areas of the deal not previously covered.
  18. As emerged near the end of the negotiations, the sanctions will have a snap back provision so that they will be automatically re-imposed if the P5+1 determine that Iran is not keeping to any and all the terms of the deal.
  19. The extensive transparency and inspection system will continue for 25 years and even after that Iran will retain such inspections under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
  20. There is no specific provision preventing proliferation arrangements between Iran and countries such as North Korea, but the terms of the agreement make the prospect of such discussions moot. As expected, the deal did not provide access to Iran’s missile development program and the military dimensions of its nuclear program or do anything about Iran’s support for terrorism, its efforts to become a regional power or its aspiration to eliminate Israel from the Middle East, butS. sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses, and ballistic missiles will remain in place. Wow!

To say this is an enormous foreign policy achievement of the Obama administration is an understatement. At the same time, when Israeli leaders insist a military attack on Iran’s facilities remain a possibility (they always theoretically will) or that the negotiations must include recognition of Israel’s right to exist, we enter the arena of cuckoo land and it is embarrassing.

The details of those parameters follow.

Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program

Below are the key parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program that were decided in Lausanne, Switzerland. These elements form the foundation upon which the final text of the JCPOA will be written between now and June 30, and reflect the significant progress that has been made in discussions between the P5+1, the European Union, and Iran. Important implementation details are still subject to negotiation, and nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. We will work to conclude the JCPOA based on these parameters over the coming months.


  • Iran has agreed to reduce by approximately two-thirds its installed centrifuges. Iran will go from having about 19,000 installed today to 6,104 installed under the deal, with only 5,060 of these enriching uranium for 10 years. All 6,104 centrifuges will be IR-1s, Iran’s first-generation centrifuge.enrichment
  • Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium over 3.67 percent for at least 15 years.
  • Iran has agreed to reduce its current stockpile of about 10,000 kg of low-enriched
  • uranium (LEU) to 300 kg of 3.67 percent LEU for 15 years.
  • All excess centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure will be placed in IAEA monitored storage and will be used only as replacements for operating centrifuges and equipment.
  • Iran has agreed to not build any new facilities for the purpose of enriching uranium for 15 years.
  • Iran’s breakout timeline – the time that it would take for Iran to acquire enough fissile material for one weapon – is currently assessed to be 2 to 3 months. That timeline will be extended to at least one year, for a duration of at least ten years, under this framework.

Iran will convert its facility at Fordow so that it is no longer used to enrich uranium

  • Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium at its Fordow facility for at least 15 years.
  • Iran has agreed to convert its Fordow facility so that it is used for peaceful purposes only – into a nuclear, physics, technology, research center.
  • Iran has agreed to not conduct research and development associated with uranium enrichment at Fordow for 15 years.
  • Iran will not have any fissile material at Fordow for 15 years.
  • •Almost two-thirds of Fordow’s centrifuges and infrastructure will be removed. The remaining centrifuges will not enrich uranium. All centrifuges and related infrastructure will be placed under IAEA monitoring.

Iran will only enrich uranium at the Natanz facility, with only 5,060 IR-1 first-generation centrifuges for ten years.

  • Iran has agreed to only enrich uranium using its first generation (IR-1 models) centrifuges at Natanz for ten years, removing its more advanced centrifuges.
  • Iran will remove the 1,000 IR-2M centrifuges currently installed at Natanz and place them in IAEA monitored storage for ten years.
  • Iran will not use its IR-2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, or IR-8 models to produce enriched uranium for at least ten years. Iran will engage in limited research and development with its advanced centrifuges, according to a schedule and parameters which have been agreed to by the P5+1.
  • For ten years, enrichment and enrichment research and development will be limited to ensure a breakout timeline of at least 1 year. Beyond 10 years, Iran will abide by its enrichment and enrichment R&D plan submitted to the IAEA, and pursuant to the JCPOA, under the Additional Protocol resulting in certain limitations on enrichment capacity.

Inspections and Transparency

  • The IAEA will have regular access to all of Iran’s nuclear facilities, including to Iran’s enrichment facility at Natanz and its former enrichment facility at Fordow, and including the use of the most up-to-date, modern monitoring technologies.
  • Inspectors will have access to the supply chain that supports Iran’s nuclear program. The new transparency and inspections mechanisms will closely monitor materials and/or components to prevent diversion to a secret program.
  • Inspectors will have access to uranium mines and continuous surveillance at uranium mills, where Iran produces yellowcake, for 25 years.
  • Inspectors will have continuous surveillance of Iran’s centrifuge rotors and bellows production and storage facilities for 20 years. Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing base will be frozen and under continuous surveillance.
  • All centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure removed from Fordow and Natanz will be placed under continuous monitoring by the IAEA.
  • A dedicated procurement channel for Iran’s nuclear program will be established to monitor and approve, on a case by case basis, the supply, sale, or transfer to Iran of certain nuclear-related and dual use materials and technology – an additional transparency measure.
  • Iran has agreed to implement the Additional Protocol of the IAEA, providing the IAEA much greater access and information regarding Iran’s nuclear program, including both declared and undeclared facilities.
  • Iran will be required to grant access to the IAEA to investigate suspicious sites or allegations of a covert enrichment facility, conversion facility, centrifuge production facility, or yellowcake production facility anywhere in the country.
  • Iran has agreed to implement Modified Code 3.1 requiring early notification of construction of new facilities.
  • Iran will implement an agreed set of measures to address the IAEA’s concerns regarding the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of its program.

Reactors and Reprocessing

  • Iran has agreed to redesign and rebuild a heavy water research reactor in Arak, based on a design that is agreed to by the P5+1, which will not produce weapons grade plutonium, and which will support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production.
  • The original core of the reactor, which would have enabled the production of significant quantities of weapons-grade plutonium, will be destroyed or removed from the country.
  • Iran will ship all of its spent fuel from the reactor out of the country for the reactor’s lifetime.
  • Iran has committed indefinitely to not conduct reprocessing or reprocessing research and development on spent nuclear fuel.
  • Iran will not accumulate heavy water in excess of the needs of the modified Arak reactor, and will sell any remaining heavy water on the international market for 15 years.
  • Iran will not build any additional heavy water reactors for 15 years.


  • •Iran will receive sanctions relief, if it verifiably abides by its commitments.
  • •U.S. and E.U. nuclear-related sanctions will be suspended after the IAEA has verified that Iran has taken all of its key nuclear-related steps. If at any time Iran fails to fulfill its commitments, these sanctions will snap back into place.
  • The architecture of U.S. nuclear-related sanctions on Iran will be retained for much of the duration of the deal and allow for snap-back of sanctions in the event of significant non-performance.
  • All past UN Security Council resolutions on the Iran nuclear issue will be lifted simultaneous with the completion, by Iran, of nuclear-related actions addressing all key concerns (enrichment, Fordow, Arak, PMD, and transparency).
  • However, core provisions in the UN Security Council resolutions – those that deal with transfers of sensitive technologies and activities – will be re-established by a new UN Security Council resolution that will endorse the JCPOA and urge its full implementation. It will also create the procurement channel mentioned above, which will serve as a key transparency measure. Important restrictions on conventional arms and ballistic missiles, as well as provisions that allow for related cargo inspections and asset freezes, will also be incorporated by this new resolution.
  • A dispute resolution process will be specified, which enables any JCPOA participant, to seek to resolve disagreements about the performance of JCPOA commitments.
  • If an issue of significant non-performance cannot be resolved through that process, then all previous UN sanctions could be re-imposed.
  • S. sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses, and ballistic missiles will remain in place under the deal.


  • For ten years, Iran will limit domestic enrichment capacity and research and development – ensuring a breakout timeline of at least one year. Beyond that, Iran will be bound by its longer-term enrichment and enrichment research and development plan it shared with the P5+1.
  • For fifteen years, Iran will limit additional elements of its program. For instance, Iran will not build new enrichment facilities or heavy water reactors and will limit its stockpile of enriched uranium and accept enhanced transparency procedures.
  • Important inspections and transparency measures will continue well beyond 15 years. Iran’s adherence to the Additional Protocol of the IAEA is permanent, including its significant access and transparency obligations. The robust inspections of Iran’s uranium supply chain will last for 25 years.
  • Even after the period of the most stringent limitations on Iran’s nuclear program, Iran will remain a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which prohibits Iran’s development or acquisition of nuclear weapons and requires IAEA safeguards on its nuclear program.